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History of OSS

CBI - DER 107

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[illegible] 1946

[illegible], Army Ground Forces
[illegible] College
[illegible] P Streets, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Lieut. Colonel K. R. Greenfield
Chief, Historical Section

Gentlemen:

In accordance with telephone conversation of this date with Lieut. Colonel Greenfield, we hand you herewith original and two copies of document [illegible] OPERATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES IN THE CBI THEATER UNDER GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL'S COMMAND.

As you are aware, this document was prepared in compliance with directive from CBI Theater [illegible] dated 26 October 1944 and signed by Colonel [illegible].

Very truly yours,

[illegible], Jr.
Lieut. (jg) USNR
Assistant Executive
Officer

Encl.

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# OPERATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

in

[illegible]

under

GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL'S COMMAND

June 1942 - October 1944

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[illegible]

The Office of Strategic Services [illegible]

military organ of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [illegible]

Its present authorization and functions [illegible]

[illegible] Directive 155/11/D issued 27 October 1943.

In implementation of the directive, the OSS under [illegible]

Major General William J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services,

performed various missions in the CBI theater under General

Stilwell's command.

The first two OSS missions in the CBI Theater were

initiated by the Office of the Coordinator of Information, in

December of 1941. They were the Tolstoy Mission and the Eifler

Mission, subsequently known as Detachment 101. Both these

units arrived in the CBI Theater in the summer of 1942.

Subsequently a number of sabotage and secret intelli-

gence activities were developed in the China Theater in implemen-

tation of the SACO Agreement* signed on 15 April 1943 in Washington

by high-ranking officials of the American and Chinese Governments,

and under the Air Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff

(AGFRTS) established on 25 April 1944 under the command of the

14th Air Force.

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* Sino American Special Technical Cooperative Agreement, for the conduct and support of special measures in the war effort against Japan.

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[illegible] 1944 [illegible]

[illegible] April

[illegible] 1943 [illegible]

[illegible], while in [illegible]

[illegible] responsible to

General Joseph W. Stilwell and [illegible]

[illegible] Louis Mountbatten.

From June 1942 to [illegible] 1944 OSS has [illegible] [illegible] and supply bases at [illegible] (Assam), New Delhi, [illegible], Ceylon, Chungking, Kunming and [illegible], and numerous [illegible] bases in China and Burma.

Strategic Services Officers assigned to General Stilwell in the CBI theater were: from September 1942 to June 1943, Commodore Milton E. Miles, USN; from June 1943 to November 1943, Colonel Richard P. Heppner, and finally Colonel John G. Coughlin.

The Strategic Services Officer assigned to Lord Louis Mountbatten's staff in SEAC in November 1943 was Colonel Richard P. Heppner.

Since 16 March 1944 OSS in the Far East has been operating on the following basis:

OSS SU DET 101 - Nazira, Assam
OSS SU DET 202 - Chungking, China
OSS SU DET 303 - New Delhi, India
OSS SU DET 404 - Ceylon

For ease of comprehension the OSS activities [illegible] hereafter will be classified by detachment. In each instance,

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[illegible]

General [illegible] objective in the North Burma

[illegible] the re-establishment of a land route to China.

Chinese, American and British forces were trained for the [illegible] mission to regain territory necessary to the opening of the Ledo road, but up to December 1942, the only Allied unit [illegible]. Intelligence was the V Force, which was restricted to the observation of enemy movements on the trails and roads adjacent to the India-Burma border. For the success of Allied operations, a unit capable of penetrating more deeply and supplying more detailed intelligence on Jap installations, troop strength and movement was essential.

The arrival of a small detachment of 21 OSS men in the [illegible] in September, 1942, promised fulfillment of this need. [illegible] detachment, known as Det. 101, was set up to operate in [illegible] Burma for the general purpose of gathering and disseminating intelligence about the enemy and the territory in the [illegible] of organizing and directing native guerrilla forces.

By November 1944, Det. 101 had increased to 400 [illegible] 8,000 native guerrillas, mostly Kachins. In [illegible] two years they wrecked bridges and enemy trains, killed [illegible] Japanese in guerrilla operations, rescued over

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[illegible] trained [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in the command of Myitkyina [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] job of supplying intelligence, which they performed so [illegible] that eighty per cent of the Tenth Air Force's combat missions were planned on the basis of their reports. In the opinion of the Chief of Staff, the Detachment performed in an outstanding manner one of the most difficult and hazardous assignments that any military unit has ever been called upon to perform. Its record clearly demonstrates that a quasi-military organization, given an able staff and support from the Commanding General of the Theater to which it is assigned, can contribute greatly to the success of military operations.

ORGANIZATION

Upon recommendation of General Joseph W. Stilwell, the Office of Coordinator of Information (predecessor to OSS) selected Col. Carl F. Eifler, formerly a U.S. Treasury undercover agent in Mexico, to command the projected Far East mission which was to become Detachment 101. While Eifler's picked group of 20 men were in training for the job, he went ahead to Stilwell's headquarters in New Delhi, India, where on 10 September 1942 he received the following brief directive from the General:

> "a. The following initial specific mission is given you for immediate execution:
>
> To make plans for denying the use of the Myitkyina airdrome to the Japanese as an operating field. This is your primary mission. In

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[illegible] of this mission [illegible] in addition [illegible] is desired [illegible] of the railroad, the [illegible] of railroad cars, and the sinking of vessels carrying fuel will all contribute to the [illegible] of your operations. Effective [illegible] of [illegible] bridges, such as the [illegible] bridge [illegible] which would reduce rail shipments [illegible] a negligible amount. You should make a [illegible] estimate of the situation and [illegible] then inform this headquarters of your general plan.

D. Subsequent missions will be given you from time to time, but for these you will submit your plans for approval before executing them."

General Stilwell placed full responsibility on Eifler, [illegible] that the Detachment must rely entirely on its own equipment and not make any further demands upon him. He [illegible] of the interview with "Eifler, I don't want to see you again until I hear a boom in Burma!"

FIRST BASE AT NAZIRA

The main group and supplies arrived on 8 October 1942 at Nazira in Assam, previously chosen as base headquarters. Under the direction of Captain Peers the men built bashas, made desks, sorted and stored supplies and demolitions, built a radio station, started a photographic laboratory and a cryptography room and [illegible] training schedule for the first native agents. Mess supplies [illegible] be obtained locally, at least in large part, [illegible] could be bought from the U. S. Quartermaster Corps at that time, and Calcutta prices were exorbitant.

The country in which Det. 101 was to operate was the [illegible] jungle terrain, rain sodden and malarial half





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[illegible] local natives, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and employed [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] control their movements and intentions.

Under such [illegible] conditions, [illegible] [illegible] enemy, and in an oriental country, white [illegible] were out of the question. The organization of an army of guerrillas and agents chosen from among the local inhabitants was absolutely essential. With the aid of two officers of the British Army contacted in Calcutta, they obtained 12 trusted natives, most of them Kachins of North Burma, willing to perform hazardous missions. To train these and later recruits, the Americans established a school and put [illegible] through a rigorous program of instruction in radio communications, codes and ciphers, signalling, unarmed combat, weapons, demolitions, junglecraft and combat strategy dealing with [illegible] [illegible] and ambushes.

[illegible] [illegible] jungle growth and the necessity for quick [illegible] [illegible] made the ordinary heavy radio transmitter [illegible] [illegible] use, Eifler's men improvised. They re-[illegible] power transformers by hand, made tuning condensers [illegible] [illegible] chassis from scrap boxes, and by dint of hard [illegible] [illegible] ingenuity developed small transmitting and receiving [illegible] weighing approximately three pounds. Now they were ready [illegible] action.





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[illegible]

On 7 and 8 February 1943, Det. 101's first field group was dropped by parachute into the Myitkyina area. The 12 agents, whose [illegible] group, [illegible] to sabotage the Myitkyina-Mandalay railroad track near [illegible] and to destroy several enemy bridges. Also, afterward to establish [illegible] behind enemy lines and recruit friendly natives for further operations in Japanese-held territory.

Two men were parachuted into the [illegible] Valley on 7 February, followed by the remaining ten and the supplies next day after the first two had signalled an "all clear" message by means of panels. From this temporary base, six men proceeded through the jungle into a thickly inhabited area, moving by night and hiding in swamps and underbrush during the day, several times coming so near discovery that they were almost stopped out. On the night of [illegible] February in three groups of two, they set their charges along the track and under the bridges of the railroad. To give ample time for escape, they used delay fuses of from six hours to twenty-eight days.

But, unfortunately, one charge accidentally blew up five minutes after it had been placed. The Namkwin Bridge and parts of the railroad track were destroyed, but in the ensuing encounter with the Burmese police from the neighboring village

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[illegible] advised the [illegible] explosion betrayed the rest of the party, and [illegible] two [illegible] made their way back to the [illegible] agreed upon for the [illegible] natives nothing for the [illegible] made it impossible to wait longer. They moved on, leaving [illegible] and [illegible] for the other group. Crossing the Irrawaddy they made their way to [illegible] where they established headquarters, contacted [illegible] by radio, and received several food drops in the course of the ensuing weeks. In spite of a shooting encounter with a Jap patrol, the party reached Fort Hertz on 9 June after four months behind enemy lines in the jungle.

Meanwhile, the other party had remained in a small hideout for seven days after the explosion, with nothing but concentrated chocolate as nourishment, while the police were [illegible]. Fearful of going on established trails, the [illegible] pressed on through almost impenetrable jungle, under great difficulty, at times stealing native boats to cross rivers. Through the help of friendly natives they reached Fort Hertz [illegible], after a trek of nearly 300 miles.

Although Det. 101's first mission had rough sledding, it was nevertheless successful, for, in addition to gaining valuable experience, the agents in their travels had met a number of friendly Kachins who agreed to work for the organization.

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Myitkyina airport [illegible]

[illegible] However, [illegible] efficient intelligence

network was greater than ever, [illegible]

[illegible] was stepped up, and operations in Northern Burma

[illegible] in scope and importance. On New Year's day, 1943,

[illegible] W. R. Wilkinson established a base at Fort Hertz from

[illegible] future missions. By June, agents had

[illegible] deeply into Japanese territory and were working

[illegible] in a constantly expanding network. One

[illegible] succeeded in establishing himself with his radio on a

[illegible] overlooking the Myitkyina airport from where he reported

[illegible] Jap plane traffic. Another obtained employment by

[illegible] contractor, traveled up and down the Mandalay-

[illegible] railway, visited important Jap installations and

[illegible], and relayed detailed information on them to Det.

[illegible] In May, Lt. Vincent Curl with 15 trained

[illegible] the Hukawng Valley and successfully organized

[illegible] first [illegible] informers, then as an active guerrilla

[illegible]

In [illegible] theater where thickly wooded terrain gave

[illegible] installations almost complete invisibility from the



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[illegible]

[illegible] as a means they located Japanese [illegible] ammunition and fuel dumps, mainly through [illegible] air reconnaissance. After targets had been [illegible] ts were able to report on the results.

[illegible] when Major (now Colonel) William R. [illegible] officer of Det. 101, the organization [illegible] value in the field of intelligence, and [illegible] ground and air forces had asked [illegible] distribution of information. General [illegible] commanding the 10th Air Force, informed [illegible] that [illegible] to 15 March 1944 eighty [illegible] combat missions were planned on [illegible] intelligence.

[illegible] job of collecting intelligence, [illegible] other valuable services. One [illegible] rare commodity. In December [illegible] the first Japanese [illegible] approach [illegible] in the CBI theater. They were also other

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[illegible] of Det. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] plane, [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Another important [illegible] and reaching [illegible] [illegible] were reported a crash, Det. 101 headquarters [illegible] field outposts. Agents [illegible] picked up the missing pilot's trail. [illegible] of direction were [illegible] while [illegible] the [illegible].

On 20 December, a [illegible] pilot bailed out in the [illegible] area. Big jungle [illegible] sustained him for five days. [illegible] wandered aimlessly, avoiding [illegible] villages, until finally he collapsed in a [illegible] to discover him summoned a Det. 101 agent, [illegible] the pilot, gave him food and medical attention, and arranged for him to be flown out from a [illegible] landing [illegible] survivors of a B-24 [illegible] in enemy waters [illegible] by Det. 101's marine unit in a 900-mile trip, the [illegible] to date.

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[illegible] equipment, it became possible to organize the Kachin into a guerrilla force for combat duties. The Kachins, brave [illegible] fighters and eager to learn the handling of modern weapons, were violently anti-Japanese, and perfectly willing to be dropped by parachute into enemy-held territory. The Americans had gained native good will in the operations of the previous year, and were now aided in their task of organizing the Kachin Rangers by two fighting Catholic missionary priests, whose influence over the Kachins was great by reason of long residence among them and their knowledge of their language and customs. These two men had been forced to leave Burma by the Japanese advance but were willing to return into the area and perform services for Det. 101. Another personality whose services were invaluable to OSS was the four-foot ten Kachin headman and guerrilla leader Zing Htung Naw.

The guerrilla force grew rapidly in the first months of 1944. The Kachin Rangers were recruited, trained, equipped and paid by Det. 101. They were led by OSS officers, but were given a certain amount of tactical freedom. At that time Det. 101 was already a sizeable force. American personnel had increased to [illegible] officers and [illegible] enlisted men. There were 51 radios reporting from the jungle, and the native force counted over [illegible] armed men. They proved so useful in ambushes and in





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[illegible] that [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible] Japanese [illegible] outstanding operations.

During [illegible] the [illegible] although [illegible] documents, and [illegible] appeared [illegible] Kachins. They had to depend for all provisions, even water, [illegible] could be dropped to them by air. After 14 days, they were [illegible] greatly by the harassing action of the Kachin Lightning [illegible] which diverted the Japanese long enough for the two battalions to regroup and withstand the Japanese assault until reinforcements arrived.

As the march southward proceeded, intelligence from [illegible] 101 proved so useful that it was found necessary to expedite [illegible] flow of information from this source to General Stilwell's [illegible] Headquarters. With this intent a forward intelligence [illegible] section was set up at Shadazup. The OSS field groups [illegible] on all sides of Myitkyina in harassing and ambushing [illegible] correlated their activities with the needs of the [illegible] advancing upon that town, and supplied all information [illegible] trails, bridges, natural defense zones and location of [illegible] installations.

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[illegible] the approach to the Jap airstrip [illegible], however, that the unit of Det. 101 were made the chief contribution to the Merrill mission. Led by N'Naw Yang Nau, native scouts guided the approaching columns around Jap patrols, and made short-cuts by little known trails. They so completely outsmarted the Japs that they slipped the two fully-equipped battalions twice across a highway and once across a stream, both of which were in regular use by the Japs. N'Naw Yang Nau was bitten by a snake and could not continue on foot, but for the sake of the safe-conduct of the mission he persuaded Colonel Hunter, commander of the advance column, to let him continue on horseback, until he and his men led the force to the very edge of the Jap encampment, parted the bushes and showed the Marauders the Jap airfield. The Japs were not aware of the presence of two battalions of Allied troops in their midst until shots rang out from the jungle.

In the meantime another group of Kachin Rangers was assigned to diverting actions which resulted in the capture of [illegible], Seton and several smaller towns. More than 400 enemy soldiers who would otherwise have been available in the defense of Myitkyina were immobilized by this action.

Col. Hunter wired Lt. Colonel Peers that the mission could not have succeeded without the aid of Det. 101.

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[illegible]

[illegible] Detachment's services to General Wingate's Special Force in Central Burma. Through the efforts of Lieutenant Charles [illegible] of Det. 101, a regular liaison was established between Wingate's and Stilwell's headquarters, and intelligence from one to the other was relayed via Det. 101 headquarters. Services similar to those performed for Merrill's Marauders were provided for Wingate's Force. Kachins were organized to provide an intelligence screen and to perform demolitions.

The first group arrived at "Broadway"* on 29 March 1944. On the 27th of the same month the Japanese demonstrated the need for a warning and intelligence net such as Det. 101 was about to set up by launching a surprise attack which was fortunately repulsed.

In April the nucleus of a Kachin intelligence screen was provided by Captain William Cummings, who arrived at Broadway with one enlisted man and 12 natives.

Until the middle of May, when the Special Force moved away from "Broadway," Det. 101 personnel furnished the British with information regarding Japanese movement, rescued stray soldiers from the jungle, ambushed and killed Japanese soldiers

* Name of the airstrip on which Wingate's Special Force was landed by Col. Cochran's glider force.

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[illegible] the [illegible] for [illegible].

[illegible] Det. 101 [illegible] [illegible] as [illegible] [illegible] trained and equipped [illegible] were assigned to Det. 101. As the British approached Mogaung from the south, Det. 101 [illegible] General Sun's 38th Division over jungle trails from the north. During this action, armed guerrillas sought out the Japanese along the flanks of the British force and formed a semi-circular intelligence screen to the east and southeast of Mogaung. Forty-nine wounded Chindits were evacuated by Det. 101 from a hurriedly constructed airstrip. The city fell to the combined British and Chinese forces on 26 June 1944. General Sun stated that [illegible] of the Detachment's men contributed directly to the [illegible] of his attack on Mogaung from the north.

This group demonstrated what Det. 101 could offer in [illegible] intelligence and combat power between two allied forces.

[illegible] AND [illegible] OSS OPERATIONS

Having proved its value through these and other accom[illegible] Det. 101 received full recognition from the theater [illegible]. General Stilwell in a letter to the Chief of Staff, [illegible] C. Marshall, said "Services rendered by 101 to



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[illegible] forces in the [illegible] [illegible] of great value. Information furnished on routes and enemy locations and strength [illegible] us greatly." The General requested Det. 101 to recruit and organize natives until it reached a strength of 10,000.

Rescue of grounded airmen was particularly appreciated [illegible] the Air Forces. Colonel Albert L. Evans, Jr., of the 64th Fighter Group, said, "It is indeed a great morale factor for [illegible] to know that there is an organization such as yours [illegible] to aid us when in trouble." Colonel Robert R. Baker, [illegible], Commanding, ATC in CBI, thanked the Detachment formally in these words: "Upon all occasions the 101 Detachment has [illegible] cooperation to the ATC. Their swiftness of [illegible] their indifference towards all obstacles and danger [illegible] been particularly impressive. Our gratitude and appreciation [illegible] hardly be expressed in words."

The Detachment's intelligence activities expanded [illegible] further, regularly disseminating intelligence to some [illegible] air force units. Moreover General Stilwell and [illegible] often personally requested urgent information [illegible] operational nature, such as the location of an enemy unit [illegible] particularly well hidden objective. From 1 June to 15 [illegible] 150 people of all races were interrogated at a new interrogation [illegible] set up by the Detachment, where eye-witnesses gave accounts of Japanese activities, morale, conditions

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[illegible]

[illegible] were [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] more air strips were [illegible]

for the landing of supplies and the evacuation of the wounded and sick. The detachment's light planes made landings on makeshift air strips, sandbars and even dried paddy beds. In one instance a landing strip was improvised in marshy terrain by filling muddy patches with grass and [illegible] and covering the whole thing with a carpet woven from [illegible]. Another time one of Det. 101's pilots, delivering urgent [illegible] from Combat headquarters at [illegible] to [illegible], [illegible] hopping over the Jap-held jungle in weather which had grounded heavier aircraft.

[illegible] OF OPERATIONS

Since the Allied armies were moving south, some of the forward bases were relocated so as to keep ahead of the [illegible] military forces. At the same time the groups in the field were reorganized and condensed into only three operational areas. (July, 1944)

Area No. 1 was generally east of the Irrawaddy River extending south through Bhamo and east to the China border. [illegible] extended west from the Irrawaddy to the Mandalay-[illegible] lines and south to Mandalay. Area No. 3 lay west





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[illegible] the railroad line [illegible] river. [illegible] were assigned [illegible] areas were occupied, and in October the Detachment moved its headquarters [illegible].

Although by [illegible] time the Detachment had [illegible] a significant contribution toward the freeing of Northern Burma, [illegible] under General Stilwell's command continued to expand. [illegible] month, over 1,000,000 pounds of provisions and supplies were packed and dropped to units in the field, air lift being provided by the Tenth Air Force. From [illegible] air strips [illegible] behind enemy lines, the field units flew out [illegible] allied sick and wounded in [illegible] liaison planes. Detailed information which they supplied to the British was indispensable in the capture of [illegible]. By February they had killed some 4,000 Japs and dropped agents far south of [illegible] to make contact with the Shan people and establish a net in central and southern Burma.

The G-2 of the Northern Combat Area Command said that [illegible] efforts made it possible to fight with more complete knowledge of enemy positions and movements than has been possible in most other theaters of war. The record of the Detachment's performance under General Stilwell is proof that well [illegible] irregular warfare can play an important part in a [illegible] campaign.

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[illegible]

[illegible] Japanese [illegible] Air [illegible] China.

From [illegible] April [illegible] February [illegible] sions in China were conducted under SACO (Sino-American Cooperation Organization), an agreement between the U. S. Navy, OSS and the head of the Chinese Intelligence Service, whereby [illegible] was to contribute personnel [illegible] special operations against the Japanese in occupied China. [illegible] [illegible] which had preceded the SACO organization were later [illegible] under that agreement, such was the case of the [illegible] Mission [illegible] the Thai project.

In February 1944 two OSS officers began work with the [illegible] Air Force, and on 26 April 1944, with the approval of General Stilwell, the Air Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff (AGFRTS) was activated by the 14th Air Force to expand intelligence operations. At first AGFRTS simply received [illegible] [illegible] and equipment from OSS, but later was placed completely under OSS supervision.

[illegible] Mission

The mission into Tibet was activated in pre-OSS days [illegible] of the Coordinator of Information. Approved by

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President Roosevelt [illegible] the project had for its objective a reconnaissance of Tibet. The leader was Captain (now Lt. Colonel) Ilya A. Tolstoy. At that time Burma had been overrun by the Japanese and Tolstoy was asked to explore possible routes to China via Tibet in the event that the Japanese threat to India should cut China off from any other approach. He was also expected to study Axis penetration into Tibet and to investigate the possibilities of guerrilla fighting in North China.

As plans crystallized, Capt. Tolstoy got in touch with 1st Lt. (now Captain) Brooke-Dolan who, as was also true of Tolstoy, had had considerable experience exploring the wilds of Central Asia. Dolan joined the Tolstoy Mission, and together the two men gathered their equipment and set out for New Delhi, carrying with them, as a gesture of goodwill, a personal letter from President Roosevelt as well as gifts for the Dalai Lama.

Tolstoy and Dolan (better known at OSS headquarters by their code names of Mug and Slug) arrived in New Delhi in the August of 1942, reported to General Stilwell and, in line with earlier arrangements by the War Department, were permitted to travel under the cover of military observers. The men made their [illegible] arrangements and reached the last outpost near the Tibetan frontier [illegible] in October. After a delay caused by Dolan's falling





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1942, and [illegible] making [illegible] through the country they set out from India and reached Lhasa on 12 December 1942. In Lhasa they were cordially received as official representatives of the "American King," were permitted to take a great many still and moving pictures, and were granted an audience with the Dalai Lama. After a period devoted to observation of living and political conditions, as well as to attempts to win the Tibetan monks over to the Allied cause, Tolstoy and Dolan were finally given permission to undertake the most important leg of their journey; the trip from Lhasa to the China Border. They left Lhasa on 19 March 1943 and made their way safely to the Chinese border. From there they were escorted to Lanchow, where they arrived on 4 July 1943. Tolstoy had intended to carry his investigations on into North China, but while in Lanchow he was ordered to report to Chungking.

Tolstoy obeyed, and upon his arrival in August 1943 reported to General Stilwell, bringing important political intelligence in addition to topographical and economic information including data on possible airfields. Tolstoy learned for the first time of the agreements that had been reached regarding [illegible] for reconnaissance in Northern China were,



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[illegible] as it was desired to [illegible] [illegible] training camp near the Yellow River, [illegible]

Pursuant to the SACO Agreement seven (7) training camps were to be established by the American parties (a naval unit and OSS) for the purpose of instructing agents furnished by the Chinese party and preparing them for specific missions in Japanese-occupied China. OSS instructors were assigned to several camps already set up by the Navy, or charged with setting up and running new training areas. In each camp men were screened, trained and equipped for projected assignments.

Camp No. 7 at Linju, for example, was organized in October 1943 by Major (now Lt. Colonel) Arden Dow and Captain (now Major) Glennon, both of OSS, and eighteen (18) naval enlisted men trained in the United States by OSS. After the necessary physical installations had been completed, classes started in November with 305 Chinese students. They were trained in weapons, demolitions, unarmed combat, raids, ambushes, map reading, general intelligence, etc., by the American instructors and were also given military and political training by Chinese instructors. A chosen party made up of graduate students was to undertake the sabotage of a coal mine behind Japanese lines at the close of training. This operation was eventually accomplished under Chinese direction.

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On [illegible] January [illegible]

[illegible] by [illegible]

[illegible] of SACO [illegible]

[illegible] General [illegible]

instructors [illegible] from the [illegible]

[illegible] had to organize [illegible]

[illegible] ages with reporting military and general intelligence

by radio. Twenty-three of the [illegible] skilled radio

[illegible]. Training was completed 23 March.

Up to October 1944, the OSS group based on Chungking

[illegible] thirty-six (36) officers and enlisted men. An

[illegible] for the conduct of subversive psychological warfare

[illegible] established by the MO Branch of OSS, and a small Research

[illegible] unit for the reception, analysis and distribution

[illegible] intelligence functioned in Chungking.

Progress at the various camps was never entirely satis-

factory to the OSS instructors. The quality and the enthusiasm

of the students was not always of the highest; instructors were

not permitted to supervise graduates in any special assignments;

and the OSS men never could tell just where they stood with

General Tai Li, the Chinese representative on SACO. Neverthe-

less, in spite of difficulties and delays, several hundred

Chinese soldiers did receive valuable training which, in some

cases at least, [illegible] put to good use.



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[illegible]

On [illegible]

[illegible] recruit, train, equip and [illegible] agents with the purpose of [illegible] there. [illegible] Washington on condition that they [illegible] used in Thailand and not in China. [illegible] was in charge of the group and the OSS [illegible] Capt. (now Major) Nicol Smith. [illegible] the [illegible], guns, food, and camping materials had been [illegible] period of training in the United States, [illegible] for the Orient, arriving at Bombay on [illegible] a lengthy and roundabout journey. From Bombay [illegible] Det. 101 base at Nazira, Assam, for [illegible] months of uncertainty regarding OSS [illegible] the group was held for a time in Nazira. [illegible] of 1943 the Thai unit lived miserably [illegible], waiting for they knew not what, and [illegible] infested jungles of the Naga hills. [illegible] for malaria, and finally in the [illegible] unit was moved to Dibrugarh. [illegible] proceed toward Thailand, but on [illegible] ordered to Chungking where they [illegible] discovered [illegible] under the control of SACO.



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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] On 2 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] doing after-[illegible],

[illegible] excellent [illegible]

[illegible] landing [illegible] air strip was being

[illegible] China. In the course of time, [illegible]

[illegible] to transport [illegible] group to [illegible]

[illegible] base from which their [illegible]

[illegible]. Finally on [illegible] January 1944, [illegible]

[illegible] had begun their long trek to

[illegible], and the rest of the group got under[illegible]

[illegible] planes provided by the 14th Air Force

[illegible]. On 27 February the first group

[illegible] frontier. [illegible]-eight [illegible]

[illegible] the two [illegible] joint forces

[illegible] tried to start over the border,

[illegible] (director of [illegible], [illegible] of

[illegible], offered excuses [illegible] prevent their

[illegible] out with the help of [illegible]

[illegible] country, and its people [illegible]

[illegible] four men equipped with radios

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[illegible]

[illegible] region [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

OSS [illegible] first Allied intelligence [illegible] to pene-

[illegible] enemy occupied Thailand, whence OSS-trained agents [illegible]

[illegible] out intelligence obtained from high military and

[illegible] sources.

[illegible] MISSION

In the spring of 1943, OSS requested the French mili-

[illegible] in North Africa to provide the organization

[illegible] officers for activities in Indo-China. Lt. Comdr. [illegible]

[illegible] on the staff of General Giraud, was designated

[illegible] his orders were later co-signed by General

[illegible]. From the outset Meynier made it clear that

[illegible] unit of several French officers and about

[illegible] soldiers. The group was trained in a U. S. military

[illegible] and reached Chungking in the fall of 1943,

[illegible] were assigned to a SACO training area.

However, the wife of Comdr. Meynier was to be the key

[illegible] operations because she was an Annamite princess

[illegible] were among the most powerful and

[illegible] in Indo-China. Unfortunately, Madame

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[illegible] her [illegible] interned [illegible] either the mission [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] action.

The [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] wholly [illegible]. [illegible] Giraud [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] French Commando unit which landed in France in July [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] out of an internment camp and the British [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] which flew her to Great Britain where she was [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Koo, Chinese Ambassador in England. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] was then brought to Cairo early in August and then [illegible] [illegible] joined her husband. The episode cost the lives of three [illegible] [illegible] seven French soldiers but Giraud thought the price [illegible] [illegible] because of the great power this woman might [illegible] among the peoples of Indo-China.

About this time, however, French political complications [illegible], and to these were soon added disturbances of a personal [illegible]. [illegible] of the trouble hinged on the fact that the Meynier [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] assembled under Giraud's auspices before the [illegible] of the French Committee of National Liberation in [illegible] which recognized DeGaulle's leadership. The Chinese Foreign [illegible], however, was unwilling to break completely with Giraud for [illegible] [illegible] move would be detrimental to their interests in Indo-[illegible]. Consequently, the OSS-sponsored Meynier mission was [illegible] cross-fire. If it were openly pro-DeGaulle, it would

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[illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] Indo-China, it is [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] control direction.

After long [illegible] and [illegible] difficulties [illegible] [illegible] out, [illegible] French control by mutual agreement and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] with [illegible].

[illegible]

In February 1944 [illegible] OSS officers, later joined by [illegible] officers and 40 enlisted men, were attached to the [illegible] of the Fourteenth Air Force in Kunming for duty with [illegible]. This staff was a Research and Analysis unit, [illegible] so satisfactory that the Fourteenth Air Force [illegible] increasingly for basic information on the [illegible] targets of economic importance in occupied [illegible] Japan's inner zone.

The Air Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff [illegible] was activated 16 April 1944 for operations in service [illegible] Fourteenth Air Force in the First, Third, Fourth, [illegible] war areas of China. Training schools for [illegible] were established for the purpose of building [illegible] networks in enemy-controlled territory. These [illegible] of whom were recruited from earlier assignments to

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[redacted] made a definite contribution toward slowing up the Japanese advance during the Chanyi campaign in June 1944. Two privates and a sergeant with a noncommissioned officer and one other enlisted man in conducting an intelligence report at Yolo Shan in the Nanchang area volunteered to head two teams chosen from among their comrades. They departed with their units for the hard-pressed front lines. Near Yi-Yung the first team observed a Jap cavalry unit about to cross the river. The private in charge radioed a message, first in code, then in clear, over and over again for 30 hours to be absolutely sure it reached the Fourteenth Air Force. Several planes took off and caught the bulk of the cavalry unit in or about to enter the river. The Chinese army gave credit for 9,000 Japs destroyed, a figure which, according to the G2 commanding officer "may have been an exaggeration, but certainly not a large one. Thousands must surely were destroyed."

On 11 June the second private relayed an agent's report that Japanese troops were crossing the Hiang River in sampans to attack Yolo Shan. He sent a message to the Fourteenth Fighter Command. Results were even more immediate in this case as a mission already in the air was contacted and sent to the target. The sampans proved to be double-decked troop barges. A few minutes a message came back "sorry fellow, we missed one." According to a Chinese report relayed by Colonel (now



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[redacted]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] remaining [illegible]

[illegible] Columns, after long [illegible] the Chinese [illegible] periodical points, OSS teams were able to secure the Chinese [illegible] air support and to designate targets for air attacks [illegible] invaluable tactical intelligence permitted the Air Force [illegible] the enemy advance during the Changsha-Hengyang-Kweilin [illegible].

## [illegible]TION AND SCORCHING

OSS demolitions teams were also active in the [illegible]. On 17 September 1944 Major Arden Dow of OSS, while [illegible] was personally requested by Brigadier General Clinton [illegible] to demolish all roads in front of the Japanese drive [illegible] Kweilin and Liuchow.

Two demolitions teams were organized under Captain [illegible] Captain Stanley A. Staiger with Air Force [illegible] naval personnel. These teams set out from Liuchow on [illegible] 22nd. By 10 October they reported the destruction [illegible] bridges and the damaging of two others, the destruction of fourteen ferries and the establishment of four [illegible], one of them by a landslide started by explosives, [illegible] greater number of bridges and roads had been "prepared,"

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with charges set forth at a later date.

[illegible] and [illegible] their [illegible] of the Japanese advance all through [illegible] and the [illegible] in [illegible] area.

In other [illegible] Chinese guerrilla bands were contacted by [illegible] men. As previously mentioned, many of them were given training in OSS camps, equipped with weapons and demolitions, and in certain cases supplies with subversive literature to be disseminated in enemy-held territory. In exchange the guerrillas rendered many services, including hairbreadth rescues of Fourteenth Air Force airmen forced down in Japanese-occupied [illegible]. In one instance, guerrillas carrying a pilot in an [illegible] sedan chair ran into a column of Jap infantry and had [illegible] by the roadside as they filed by so near that the pilot [illegible] could have reached through the curtains of his chair [illegible] the sleeves of the marching soldiers.

[illegible] Comdr. Joseph Roberts, USNR, of OSS, trained guerrilla bands in the Canton area in the summer of 1944. He [illegible] guerrilla leader known as the "Madman" and ten of his [illegible] demolitions. When the Madman had completed [illegible] to blow up a military locomotive and some [illegible] Canton-Kowloon railroad. On the way, he and his [illegible] five Jap military trucks containing 40 Japs,



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[illegible]

[illegible] to blow up planes. [illegible]

[illegible] under more favorable conditions, he returned to the Canton-Kowloon railroad and blew it up in 10 places.

The Mission's greatest demolition job was the blowing up of the [illegible] coal mine, the only one in Kwangtung province [illegible] coal for enemy consumption. [illegible] so completely that they destroyed the generators, flattened the boilers and blew up and blocked all seven shafts. Thus in a [illegible] stroke, these OSS-trained demolitions experts deprived [illegible] for six months of their only local supply of coal for water works, electric power stations, and railroads vital to [illegible] industry, and cast an increased burden on overstrained Jap shipping. "I [illegible] particularly pleased," wrote Roberts, "because [illegible] had tried to destroy it seven months [illegible] and failed."

In early September it became evident that the Chinese [illegible] not capable of offering effective resistance

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[illegible] ready in [illegible]

[illegible] 14th Air Force [illegible]

[illegible] destroy such [illegible]

[illegible], OSS presented a plan for [illegible]

[illegible] counting of the [illegible]

[illegible] neither the 14th Air Force nor the Chinese were

[illegible] to undertake. With the approval of the [illegible]

[illegible] demolition teams selected and [illegible] such targets [illegible]

[illegible] and [illegible] blocked by demolitions. They

[illegible] target after obtaining the approval of the local

[illegible]. At the same time these teams radioed frequent

[illegible] enemy [illegible] which were greatly needed by the 14th [illegible]

[illegible] not only in attacking the enemy but in scheduling

[illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] case of Det. 101, OSS activities initiated

[illegible]'s command continued to expand after

[illegible] Counter-espionage units were established to

[illegible] plain clothes agents and protect U.S. air

[illegible]. Demolition teams working with the Chinese

[illegible] disrupt Japanese communication lines, blow up

[illegible] destroy military trains, in one instance

[illegible] casualties.

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[illegible] 1944, [illegible] flew, [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] at the Foochow [illegible] posters and slogans on [illegible] and [illegible] them to [illegible], barracks and to puppet and Jap officials. They [illegible] and controlling the policy of a Jap-operated newspaper and penetrated the Japanese [illegible] organization. Before the city fell, over 100 Japanese soldiers had been stationed [illegible] Foochow in a vain effort to combat the spread of [illegible] [illegible].

Intelligence services in particular hit their stride. [illegible], 1944, AGFRTS, engaged in ground intelligence, [illegible] and coast watching, was contributing over [illegible] of the intelligence received by the 14th Air Force [illegible] sources. The Tenth Weather Squadron received [illegible] average of 60 weather reports which were [illegible] weather map within 20 minutes after [illegible]. Coast watchers in Southern China in one instance [illegible] Jap vessels; the report was relayed to [illegible], and the entire group was sunk. The

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[illegible]

[illegible] a staff of [illegible]

been [illegible]

of [illegible] in Jap-[illegible]

of [illegible] Chamber of Commerce, [illegible]

[illegible] and [illegible] boards and [illegible]

[illegible] and to puppet and Jap officials. They [illegible] controlled the policy of a Jap-operated newspaper [illegible] the Japanese counter-MO organization. Before the [illegible], over 100 Japanese soldiers had been stationed [illegible] in a vain effort to combat the spread of MO [illegible].

[illegible]telligence services in particular hit their stride. [illegible] February, 1945, [illegible], engaged in ground intelligence, [illegible] and coast watching, was contributing over [illegible] of the intelligence received by the 14th Air Force [illegible] sources. The Tenth Weather Squadron received [illegible] of 20 weather reports which were [illegible] weather map within 20 minutes after [illegible] coast-watchers in southern China in one instance [illegible] vessels; the report was relayed to [illegible] and the entire group was sunk. The

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[illegible] results, [illegible] for [illegible] a staff of 12 Chinese [illegible] Chinese [illegible] confusion, disruption of communications and [illegible] of [illegible] orders in Jap-occupied Foochow. They recruited members of the Foochow Chamber of Commerce, who [illegible] posters and [illegible] on walls and Jap bulletin boards and mailed them to schools, barracks and to puppet and Jap officials. They infiltrated and controlled the policy of a Jap-operated newspaper and penetrated the Japanese counter-MO organization. Before the city fell, over 100 Japanese soldiers had been stationed [illegible] Foochow in a vain effort to combat the spread of MO [illegible].

Intelligence services in particular hit their stride. [illegible] February, 1945, AGFRTS, engaged in ground intelligence, [illegible] reporting and coast watching, was contributing over [illegible] of the intelligence received by the 14th Air Force [illegible] military sources. The Tenth Weather Squadron received [illegible] average of 20 weather reports which were [illegible] weather map within 20 minutes after [illegible]. Coast-watchers in southern China in one instance [illegible] of Jap vessels; the report was relayed to [illegible], and the entire group was sunk. The

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Commander-in-Chief of the [illegible] Pearl Harbor.

[illegible] the intelligence network was [illegible] from American [illegible] officials. In one instance, radio equipment [illegible] carried to its destination by [illegible] a Japanese Army [illegible], the message [illegible] by a Japanese military [illegible] from [illegible].

The most valuable single document obtained in the [illegible] since the beginning of the war was obtained [illegible] by [illegible] agents. It was a book containing the code addresses for the units of the Japanese Army, the equivalent of a [illegible] the APO addresses of every unit in the American Army. [illegible] were sent to the Theater G-2 and to Washington. [illegible] Dickey, Theater G-2, said that SI was a primary [illegible] Theater intelligence.

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[illegible]

[illegible] leading to the activation of Det. [illegible] Colonel (then Major) [illegible] to investigate the [illegible] of [illegible] OSS activities in the CBI Theater. During the [illegible] of 1943 he was joined by several other officers, all of whom shared working quarters in one room in the CBI Headquarters Building. In November this unit, to be known as Det. 303, moved to 32 Feroz Shah Road.

(Headquarters of Lord Louis Mountbatten's South East Asia Command were situated in New Delhi until April 1944, and when Colonel Richard P. Heppner was assigned to this Command as [illegible] Service Officer (November 1943), OSS/SEAC, [illegible] Det. 404, was also based in New Delhi. In April [illegible] moved to Kandy, Ceylon, with the SEAC Headquarters, [illegible] behind a small rear-echelon unit.)

The OSS/CBI New Delhi unit was officially established [illegible] on 16 March 1944, with an authorized strength of [illegible] (12) officers and three (3) enlisted men. The [illegible] Analysis Branch of OSS furnished the first and [illegible] contingent of this Detachment, but in the course of [illegible] other branches of OSS were represented. Beginning in May [illegible], the unit grew in size so that on 26 October 1944, its [illegible] listed twenty (20) officers, fifteen (15) enlisted men,

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[illegible] established.

Unlike Dets. 101 and 404, Det. 202 was never directly [illegible] as [illegible] operating against the enemy. Its main accomplishments were those of a headquarters and liaison organization, important but not spectacular. In general it may be said that this Detachment served to coordinate and service other outposts of [illegible], to initiate and maintain liaison with other United States war agencies in the CBI Theater and with the British, and to provide a flow of intelligence material to other outposts and to Washington.

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[illegible] SECRET

As mentioned in the summary at the beginning of this paper, OSS in the Asiatic Theater was subdivided in November 1943 into OSS/CBI and OSS/SEAC. OSS/SEAC was put under the command of Col. Richard P. Heppner who was assigned to the South East Asia Command as Strategic Services Officer. In March 1944 OSS/SEAC became known as Det. 404.

This group was responsible to Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander, SEA. On 16 December 1943, Admiral Mountbatten established the "P" Division and assigned it the duty of supervising and coordinating the plans and activities of all quasi-military and irregular forces in the SEAC theater. This directive was supplemented by an order to OSS from CBI headquarters, and OSS units have carefully complied with these instructions. The purpose of Det. 404 was to obtain intelligence in all parts of the theater, execute maritime operations of a coup-de-main type requiring light planes and motor boats, carry on morale subversion and develop special tactics and weapons. OSS/SEAC procured sites at Trincomalee and in Colombo; and in January, 1944, began training a number of Indonesian agents. Early in February, OSS/SEAC acquired a headquarters site in Kandy, began a training camp for operational groups at Galle, and subsequently established a school at [illegible] and a forward base at Chittagong.

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[illegible] of OSS headquarters in Kandy [illegible] a rear echelon was maintained in New Delhi.

Of all operations launched by OSS/SEAC, the most interesting and fruitful was the infiltration of Thailand. In the summer of 1944, when General Stilwell temporarily replaced Lord Mountbatten as Allied Supreme Commander in SEAC, Col. Heppner submitted an OSS plan for the penetration of that country. The General took keen interest in the proposals, made a number of concrete suggestions and gave indispensable aid in getting the project under way.

In October, two OSS-trained native Thai agents were successfully parachuted into their home country, where they [illegible] contacts and began radioing military and political intelligence hitherto unavailable, including virtually complete order of battle information on Japanese troops in Thailand.

Another OSS project which began during General Stilwell's command in SEAC was full-scale assistance to the British 15th Corps fighting on the Arakan coast. Under Major Richard L. Farr, a complete 130-man OSS team reached the Arakan in December 1944. Quickly establishing themselves, they made successful reconnaissance raids into enemy territory.

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[illegible] and the [illegible] of OSS [illegible] immediately distributed to the Corps commander, [illegible] to depend upon the OSS as his principal source of intelligence. This cooperation continued until the fall of [illegible] in April.

In addition to these larger undertakings, OSS/CBI initiated several minor projects during Stilwell's command which also came to fruition later. These consisted chiefly of reconnaissance missions along the coasts of Burma, Malay and Sumatra.

A review of its activities in the CBI Theater from the fall of 1942 to 26 October 1944, shows that OSS exploited the opportunities made possible by a Theater Commander sympathetic to the aims and methods of an organization engaged in irregular warfare. OSS provided detailed information on areas wherein military operations were being contemplated; recruited, trained, and equipped agents, and placed them behind enemy lines; gathered and forwarded intelligence from enemy territory and analyzed such intelligence; developed new types of equipment; organized resistance groups among native peoples; made good use of propaganda [illegible]; effected counter-espionage measures; and an



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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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June 1942 - October 1944

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[illegible]

The Office of [illegible] Services [illegible] by [illegible] Order of the [illegible] on 13 June 194[illegible].

Its present [illegible] Joint Chiefs [illegible] Directive 155/11/D dated 27 October 194[illegible].

In implementation of the directive, the OSS under [illegible] General William J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services, performed [illegible] missions in the CBI Theater under General [illegible] command.

The first two OSS missions in the CBI Theater were [illegible] by the Office of the Coordinator of Information, [illegible] of OSS. They were the Tolstoy Mission and the [illegible] [illegible], subsequently known as Detachment 101. Both these [illegible] in the CBI Theater in the summer of 1942.

[illegible] a number of sabotage and secret intelli- [illegible] activities were developed in the China Theater in implemen- [illegible] of the [illegible] Agreement* signed on 15 April 1943 in Washington by [illegible] officials of the American and Chinese Governments, [illegible] the Air Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff [illegible] on 26 April 1944 under the command of the [illegible].

---

* [illegible] Special Technical Cooperative Agreement, for the [illegible] support of special measures in the war effort against [illegible].

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After the first Roosevelt-Churchill Conference in [illegible] the South East Asia Theater was created under Admiral [illegible] Louis Mountbatten. Accordingly in November 1943 General [illegible]onovan, while in New Delhi, divided the OSS in the Asiatic Theater into two parts: OSS/CBI, which was made responsible to General Joseph W. Stilwell and OSS/SEAC, which was placed under [illegible] Louis Mountbatten.

From June 1942 to October 1944 OSS has maintained [illegible] and supply bases at Nazira, (ASSAM), New Delhi, [illegible], Ceylon, Chungking, Kunming and Kweilin, and numerous [illegible] in India and Burma.

Strategic Services Officers assigned to General Stilwell in the CBI theater were: from September 1942 to June 1943 [illegible] Milton E. Miles, USN. From June 1943 to November 1943 [illegible] Heppner, and finally Colonel John G. Coughlin.

The Strategic Services officer assigned to Lord Louis [illegible] in SEAC in November 1943 was Colonel Richard [illegible].

[illegible] 1944 OSS in the Far East has been [illegible] following bases:

[illegible] DET 101 - Nazira, Assam
[illegible] DET 202 - Chungking, China
[illegible] DET 303 - New Delhi, India
[illegible] DET 404 - Ceylon

[illegible] convenience the OSS operations described [illegible] classified by detachment. In some instances,

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General Stilwell's objective in the North Burma Campaign was the re-establishment of a land route to China. Chinese, American and British forces were trained for the assault mission to regain territory necessary to the opening of the Ledo road. But up to [illegible], the only Allied unit supplying intelligence was the "V" Force, which was restricted to the observation of enemy movements on the trails and roads adjacent to the India-Burma border. For the success of Allied operations, a unit capable of penetrating more deeply and supplying more detailed intelligence on Jap installation, troop strength, and movement was essential.

The arrival of a small detachment of 21 OSS men in the theater in September, 1942, promised fulfillment of this need. This detachment, known as Det. 101, was set up to operate in northern Burma for the general purpose of gathering and disseminating intelligence about the enemy and the territory in the area, and of organizing and directing native guerrilla forces.

By November 1944, Det. 101 had increased to 400 Americans and [illegible],000 native guerrillas, mostly Kachins. In the two years they wrecked bridges and enemy trains, killed more than [illegible] Japanese in guerrilla operations, rescued over

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[illegible] allied [illegible] and [illegible]

[illegible] to the main job of [illegible] intelligence, which was [illegible] so thoroughly that [illegible] of the [illegible] combat missions were planned on the basis of their reports. In the opinion of the Chief of Staff, the Detachment performed in an outstanding manner one of the most difficult and hazardous assignments that any military unit has ever been called upon to perform. Its record clearly demonstrates that a quasi-military organization, given an able staff and support from the Commanding General of the theater to which it is assigned, can contribute greatly to the success of military operations.

ORGANIZATION

Upon recommendation of General Joseph W. Stilwell, the Office of Coordinator of Information (predecessor to OSS) selected Col. Carl F. Eifler, formerly a U.S. Treasury undercover agent in Mexico, to command the projected Far East mission which was to become Detachment 101. While Eifler's picked group of men were in training for the job, he went ahead to Stilwell's headquarters in New Delhi, India, where on 15 September 1942 he received the following brief directive from the General:

> "a. The following initial specific mission is given you for immediate execution:
>
> To make plans for denying the use of the Myitkyina airdrome to the Japanese as an operating field. This is your primary mission. In





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[illegible] plan.

b. Subsequent [illegible] will be given you from time to time, but for these [illegible] your plans for approval before executing them."

General Stilwell placed full responsibility on Eifler, [illegible] him that the Detachment must rely entirely on its own [illegible] and not make any further demands upon him. He [illegible] the interview with "Eifler, I don't want to see you [illegible] until I hear a boom in Burma!"

BASE [illegible] AT NAZIRA

The main group and supplies arrived on 3 October 1942 [illegible] in Assam, previously chosen as base headquarters. Under [illegible] of Captain Coote the men built camps, made [illegible] stored supplies and demolitions, built a radio station, [illegible] photographic laboratory and a cryptography room and [illegible] training schedule for the first native agents. [illegible] be obtained locally, at least in large part; [illegible] could be bought from the U. S. Quartermaster Corps [illegible] Calcutta prices were exorbitant.

The country in which Det. 101 was to operate was the [illegible] of jungle terrain, rain sodden and malarial half [illegible]





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[illegible] incidentally, [illegible] to [illegible], [illegible] illogical [illegible] of action to [illegible] their whereabouts and intentions.

Under such natural conditions, [illegible] every [illegible] in an oriental country, white agents were out of the question. The organization of an army of guerrillas and agents chosen from among the local inhabitants was absolutely essential. With the aid of two officers of the British Army contacted in Calcutta, they obtained 12 trusted natives, most of them Kachins of North Burma, willing to perform hazardous missions. To train these and later recruits, the Americans established a school and put [illegible] students through a rigorous program of instruction in radio communications, codes and ciphers, signalling, unarmed combat, [illegible], demolitions, junglecraft and combat strategy dealing with [illegible] blocks and ambushes.

Since matted jungle growth and the necessity for quick movement on short notice made the ordinary heavy radio transmitter [illegible] impossible for agent use, Eifler's men improvised. They re-[illegible] power transformers by hand, made tuning condensers from tin cans and chassis from scrap boxes, and by dint of hard [illegible] ingenuity developed small transmitting and receiving sets weighing approximately three pounds. Now they were ready [illegible]

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[illegible]

On 7 and 8 February 1943, Det. 101's first field group was dropped by parachute into the Myitkyina area. The 12 agents, known as "A" Group, had as their mission to sabotage the Myitkyina-Mandalay railroad track near Namkwin and to destroy several nearby bridges. Also, they were to establish themselves behind enemy lines and recruit friendly natives for further operations in Japanese-held territory.

Two men were parachuted into the Koukkwe Valley on 7 February, followed by the remaining ten and the supplies next day after the first two had signalled an "all clear" message by means of panels. From this temporary base, six men proceeded through the jungle into a thickly inhabited area, moving by night and hiding in swamps and underbrush during the day, several times coming so near discovery that they were almost stepped on. On the night of 23 February in three groups of two, they set their charges along the track and under the bridges of the railroad. To give ample time for escape, they used delay fuses of from six hours to twenty-eight days.

But, unfortunately, one charge accidentally blew up five minutes after it had been placed. The Namkwin Bridge and part of the railroad track were destroyed, but in the ensuing encounter with the Burmese police from the neighboring village

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one [illegible] had [illegible]. The [illegible] [illegible] the rest of the party, and they were forced to make a getaway. [illegible] made their way back to the [illegible] base and waited until the agreed hour for the missing four. Pro-Japanese police, soldiers and natives hunting for the saboteurs made it impossible to wait longer. They moved on, leaving a note and buried supplies for the other group. Crossing the Irrawaddy they made their way to Lasampaba where they established headquarters, contacted base by radio, and received several food drops in the course of the ensuing weeks. In spite of a shooting encounter with a [illegible] patrol, the party reached Fort Hertz on 9 June after four months behind enemy lines in the jungle.

Meanwhile, the other party had remained in a small hide-out for seven days after the explosion, with nothing but concentrated chocolate as nourishment, while the police were all around them. Fearful of going on established trails, the group pushed on through almost impenetrable jungle, under great hardships, at times stealing native boats to cross rivers. Through the help of friendly natives they reached Fort Hertz in late May, after a trek of nearly 300 miles.

Although Det. 101's first mission had rough sledding, it was nevertheless successful, for, in addition to gaining valuable experience, the agents in their travels had met a number of friendly Kachins who agreed to work for the organization.

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[illegible] through [illegible] targets. [illegible] for the Air Force a [illegible] bridge [illegible] Japanese [illegible] constructed so that the [illegible] was just below the surface of the water, making it practically invisible from the air. In the same manner [illegible] Japanese troop concentrations, ammunition and fuel dumps, supply stores etc., safely hidden from air reconnaissance. After targets had been bombed, these same agents were able to report on the results.

By 17 December when Major (now Colonel) William R. Peers became commanding officer of Det. 101, the organization had established its value in the field of intelligence, and [illegible] more units of the ground and air forces had asked to be included in the distribution of information. General Howard C. Davidson, Commanding the 10th Air Force, informed General [illegible] by a letter that up to 15 March 1944 eighty per cent of all [illegible] Force's combat missions were planned on basis of Det. 101 intelligence.

In addition to the main job of collecting intelligence, the network performed numerous other valuable services. One [illegible] supplying Jap prisoners - a rare commodity. In December [illegible] detachment captured the first Japanese officer apprehended by Allied forces in the CBI theater. They marched other

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prisoners out through miles of jungle, handcuffed and [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] Miller brought a Jap prisoner out [illegible] alone, with a rope around the captive's neck, [illegible] no [illegible] difficulty on the way. Most of these prisoners, particularly the officers, responded to interrogation and supplied much valuable information.

Another important addition to Det. 101's intelligence work was rescuing airmen grounded in the jungle. Whenever the Air Forces reported a crash, Det. 101 headquarters radioed all field outposts. Agents scoured the jungle and frequently picked up the missing pilots' trail. Some airmen who had lost their sense of direction were overtaken while heading for the Jap lines.

On 28 December, a wounded pilot bailed out in the [illegible] area. His jungle kit rations sustained him for five days. For seven more he wandered aimlessly, avoiding Kachin [illegible] villages, until finally he collapsed in a pigpen. The first natives to discover him summoned a Det. 101 agent, who revived the pilot, gave him food and medical attention, and arranged for him to be flown out from a secret landing strip. Again, nine survivors of a B-24 crashed in enemy waters were rescued by Det. 101's marine unit in a 900-mile trip, the longest of its kind on record to date.





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[illegible] [illegible] The [illegible] and [illegible] Burma [illegible] [illegible] guerrilla [illegible] [illegible] the Kachin [illegible] and [illegible] fighters and [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible], were [illegible] anti-Japanese and [illegible] willing to be dropped by parachute [illegible] territory. The [illegible] had [illegible] [illegible] in the operations of the previous year, and were [illegible] in their task of organizing the Kachin Rangers by two fighting Catholic missionary priests, whose influence over the Kachins was great by reason of long residence among them and their knowledge of their language and customs. These two men had been forced to leave Burma after the Japanese advance but were willing to return into the area and perform services for Det. 101. Another personality whose services were invaluable to OSS was the four-foot ten Kachin headman and guerrilla leader Zing Htung Naw.

The guerrilla force grew rapidly in the first months [illegible]. The Kachin Rangers were recruited, trained, equipped [illegible] by Det. 101. They were led by OSS officers, but were [illegible] [illegible] amount of tactical freedom. At that time Det. [illegible] was already a sizable force: American personnel had in[illegible] [illegible] officers and 65 enlisted men. There were 31 radios [illegible] in the jungle, and the native force counted over [illegible] men. They proved so useful in ambushes and in

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[illegible] Stilwell instructed [illegible] Colonel Peers to increase the Detachment's native strength to [illegible] [illegible] arms, equipment and [illegible] to aid this expansion.

[illegible]

Det. 101's greatest opportunity came in March 1944 when the Allied drive in Burma got under way. Simultaneous [illegible] of Chinese troops under Brigadier General Merrill [illegible] through the Hukawng Valley, and an airborne operation coordinated with this main thrust placed a British force under General Wingate astride the Japanese lines of communications in Central Burma. Strategically situated between these two forces, [illegible] agents acted as liaison and supplied to them intelligence, rescue and guide services and trained guerrillas to perform [illegible] and diverting operations.

[illegible] Merrill's forces moved south, they had to pass [illegible] Hukawng, in which one of Det. 101's groups operated. [illegible] under Captain Vincent Curl furnished an intelligence net [illegible] Merrill's columns and to the Chinese Divisions, [illegible] posted on enemy strength and movements and guiding [illegible] best routes and trails through difficult terrain. [illegible] pin-pointed Japanese positions for air attack and relayed [illegible] information directly to General Merrill's S-2. As the



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[illegible] force [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] fully [illegible] [illegible] ambushing [illegible]

During [illegible] [illegible] surrounded [illegible] reinforcements, [illegible] [illegible] They had to depend [illegible] provisions [illegible] could be dropped to them by air. After [illegible] days, they were aided greatly by the harassing action of the [illegible] fighting force which diverted the Japanese long enough for the two battalions to regroup and withstand the Japanese attack until reinforcements arrived.

As the drive southward proceeded, intelligence from [illegible] proved so useful that it was found necessary to expedite the flow of information from this source to General Stilwell's [illegible] headquarters. With this intent a forward intelligence and liaison section was set up at Shaduzup. The OSS field groups operating on all sides of Myitkyina in harassing and ambushing [illegible] correlated their activities with the needs of the [illegible] converging upon that town, and supplied all information on trails, bridges, natural defense zones and location of Japanese installations.

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[illegible] the Jap airfield at [illegible]

[illegible] Sept. 15, were

[illegible] the Merrill mission [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] of Little [illegible]

[illegible]

the fully-equipped [illegible]

[illegible] strong, [illegible] by the Japs.

[illegible] was [illegible]

foot, [illegible] for the [illegible] of the [illegible]

[illegible] Colonel Hunter, commander of the advance column, to

[illegible] on [illegible], until he had [illegible]

[illegible] to the very edge of the Jap encampment, [illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible] showed the Marauders the Jap airfield. The Japs were not

aware of the presence of two battalions of Allied troops in their

midst until shots rang out from the jungle.

In the meantime another group of Kachin Rangers was

[illegible] diverting actions which resulted in the capture of

[illegible], [illegible] and several smaller towns. More than 400 enemy

[illegible] who would otherwise have been available in the defense

[illegible] were immobilized by this action.

Col. Hunter wired Lt. Colonel Peers that the mission

[illegible] have succeeded without the aid of Det. 101.

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**SERVICES RENDERED TO GENERAL WINGATE'S SPECIAL FORCE**

As previously mentioned the Detachment also offered its services to General Wingate's Special Force in Central Burma. Through the offices of Lieutenant Charles Stelle, of Det. 101, a regular liaison was established between Wingate's and Stilwell's headquarters, and intelligence from one to the other was relayed via the detachment. Services similar to those performed for Merrill's columns were provided for Wingate's force. Kachins were organized to provide an intelligence screen and to perform demolitions.

The first group arrived at "Broadway"* on 23 March 1944. On the 29th of the same month the Japanese demonstrated the need for a warning and intelligence net such as Det. 101 was about to set up by launching a surprise attack which was fortunately repulsed.

In April the nucleus of a Kachin intelligence screen was provided by Captain William Cummings, who arrived at Broadway with one enlisted man and 12 natives.

Until the middle of May, when the Special Force moved away from "Broadway," Det. 101 personnel furnished the British with information regarding Japanese movement, rescued stray soldiers from the jungle, ambushed and killed Japanese soldiers

* Base of ... airstrip on which Wingate's Special Force was landed by Col. Cochran's glider force.



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[illegible]

during the intelligence [illegible] activities.

When the British [illegible] Det. 101 [illegible] to Chindits. Subsequently 120 British trained and equipped Kachins were assigned to Det. 101. As the British approached Mogaung from the south, Det. 101 guerrillas led elements of General Sun's 38th Division over jungle trails from the north. During this action, armed guerrillas fought out the Japanese along the flanks of the British force and formed a semi-circular intelligence screen to the east and southeast of Mogaung. Forty-nine wounded Chindits were evacuated by Det. 101 from a hurriedly constructed airstrip. The city fell to the combined British and Chinese forces on 26 June 1944. General Sun stated that the help of the Detachment's men contributed directly to the success of his attack on Mogaung from the north.

This group demonstrated what Det. 101 could offer in coordinating intelligence and combat power between two allied forces.

RECOGNITION AND NEW OSS OPERATIONS

Having proved its value through these and other accomplishments Det. 101 received full recognition from the theater commander. General Stilwell in a letter to the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, said "Services rendered by 101 to





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[illegible] in [illegible] were of great value. Information furnished by [illegible] and enemy [illegible] and [illegible] enabled us greatly." [illegible] Det. 101 to recruit, arm and organize natives until it reached a strength of 10,0[illegible].

Rescue of grounded airmen was particularly appreciated by the Air Forces. Colonel Albert [illegible], Jr., of the [illegible] Fighter Group, said, "It is indeed a great morale factor for all of us to know that there is an organization such as yours, ready to aid us when in trouble." Colonel [illegible] H. [illegible], A.C., Commanding, ATC in CBI, thanked the Detachment formally in these words, "Upon all occasions the 101 Detachment has given admirable cooperation to the ATC. Their swiftness of action and their indifference towards all obstacles and danger has been particularly impressive. Our gratitude and appreciation can hardly be expressed in words."

The Detachment's intelligence activities expanded still further, regularly disseminating intelligence to some 43 ground and air force units. Moreover General Stilwell and Colonel Cochran often personally requested urgent information of an operational nature, such as the location of an enemy unit or of a particularly well hidden objective. From 1 June to 15 August [illegible] people of all races were interrogated at a new Interrogation Headquarters set up by the Detachment, where eye-witnesses gave accounts of Japanese activities, morale, conditions

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of [illegible] buildings, [illegible] all of which [illegible] relayed to the appropriate military authorities. More and more of the intelligence was being processed by the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS which was also being relied on for [illegible] maps to help Allied troops entering Burma south of Myitkyina.

Another branch of OSS, the Research and Development Branch, was proving increasingly useful in connection with the operations of Det. 101 by providing devices to drive the Japanese from deep foxholes and other hiding places inaccessible to regular army equipment. For example, our tanks were often attacked by Japs hiding in the tall grass, who hurled incendiaries that stuck to the armour and forced the crew out into the open. In a plan to fight fire with fire, R&D has devised a snake-like incendiary capable of setting fire to large areas of grass land.

Subversive psychological warfare was also being used increasingly by Det. 101, in correlation with the OWI's straight propaganda operations. Kachins were being trained to spread rumors, or to disseminate subversive pamphlets or stickers to Jap troops. A leaflet was prepared urging Burmans in the North to disregard requests of a Japanese officer for them to leave their homes when the Japs retreated. Ten thousand copies of this leaflet were printed and disseminated.



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[illegible] air [illegible] of [illegible]

of one L-4 [illegible] planes. These were piloted by [illegible]

[illegible] assigned [illegible] from the 71st Liaison Squadron.

In [illegible] air strips were completed [illegible]

for the landing of [illegible] evacuation of [illegible]

[illegible]. The [illegible] planes were [illegible]

[illegible] landing on [illegible] and even dried-

[illegible] bogs. In one instance a landing strip was improvised

in [illegible] terrain by filling muddy [illegible] with [illegible]

branches and covering the whole thing [illegible] from

[illegible]. Another time one of Det. 101's pilots delivered urgent

information from [illegible] at [illegible] to Myitkyina

[illegible] over the Japanese jungle in weather which had

[illegible] aircraft.

[illegible] OF OPERATIONS

[illegible] the Allied armies were moving south, some of

[illegible] forward areas were relocated so as to keep ahead of

[illegible] military forces. At the same time the groups in

[illegible] were reorganized and condensed into only three opera-

[illegible] (July, 1944)

[illegible] generally east of the Irrawaddy River

[illegible] and east to the China border.

[illegible] west from the Irrawaddy to the Mandalay-

[illegible] and south to Mandalay. Area No. 3 lay west





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[illegible] Irrawaddy River. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] the headquarters [illegible].

Although by that time the Detachment had already made a significant contribution toward the freeing of Northern Burma, work behind enemy lines under General Stilwell's command continued to expand. Each month, over 1,000,000 pounds of provisions and supplies were packed and dropped to units in the field, air lift being provided by the Tenth Air Force. From six air strips concealed behind enemy lines, the field units flew out prisoners and Allied sick and wounded in Det. 101 liaison planes. Detailed information which they supplied to the British was indispensable in the capture of [illegible]. By February they had killed some 4,000 Japs and dropped agents far south of Mandalay to make contact with the Shan people and establish a net in central and southern Burma.

The G-2 of the Northern Combat Area Command said that Det. 101's efforts made it possible to fight with more complete knowledge of enemy positions and movements than has been possible in any other theaters of war. The record of the Detachment's performance under General Stilwell is proof that well organized irregular warfare can play an important part in a military campaign.





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[illegible]

[illegible] in China [illegible] since September 194[illegible] [illegible] located in Kunming [illegible].

From 15 April 1943 to 12 February 1944, all [illegible] in China were conducted under SACO (Sino-American Cooperation Organization), an agreement between the United States Navy and the head of the Chinese Intelligence Service, whereby each was to contribute personnel or facilities for special operations against the Japanese in occupied China. Some OSS activities which had preceded the SACO organization were later placed under that agreement. Such was the case of the Tolstoy mission and the Thai project.

In February 1944 two OSS officers began work with the 14th Air Force, and on 26 April 1944, with the approval of General Stilwell, the Air Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff (AGFRTS) was activated by the 14th Air Force to expand intelligence operations. At first AGFRTS simply received some personnel and equipment from OSS, but later was placed completely under OSS supervision.

The Tolstoy Mission

This mission into Tibet was activated in pre-OSS days by the [illegible] of the Coordinator of Information. Approved by



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President Roosevelt on [illegible] May 194[illegible], the project had for its objective a reconnaissance of Tibet. The leader was Captain (now Lt. Colonel) Ilya A. Tolstoy. At that time Burma had been overrun by the Japanese and Tolstoy was asked to explore possible routes to China via Tibet in the event that the Japanese threat to India should cut China off from any other approach. He was also expected to study Axis penetration into Tibet and to investigate the possibilities of guerrilla fighting in Western China.

As plans crystallized, Capt. Tolstoy got in touch with 1st Lt. (now Captain) Brooke Dolan who, as was also true of Tolstoy, had had considerable experience exploring the wilds of Central Asia. Dolan joined the Tolstoy Mission, and together the two men gathered their equipment and set out for New Delhi, carrying with them, as a gesture of good-will, a personal letter from President Roosevelt as well as gifts for the Dalai Lama.

Tolstoy and Dolan (better known at OSS headquarters by their code names of Mud and Slag) arrived in New Delhi during August of 1942, reported to General Stilwell and, in line with earlier arrangements by the War Department, were permitted to travel under the cover of military observers. The men made their final arrangements and reached the last outpost near the Tibetan border late in October. After a delay caused by Dolan's falling

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[illegible] of negotiations with the [illegible] country, [illegible] them on [illegible] October 1942. [illegible] They were [illegible] received as official [illegible] of the [illegible] were [illegible] to take [illegible] and moving pictures, and were presented [illegible] the Dalai Lama. [illegible] gained [illegible] of living and political conditions [illegible] the [illegible] Tolstoy and Dolan were finally given permission to undertake the most [illegible] of their journey, the trip from Lhasa to the Chinese border. [illegible] left Lhasa on [illegible] March 1943 and made their way [illegible] to the Chinese border. From there they were escorted to Lanchow, [illegible] arrived on [illegible] July 1943. Tolstoy had intended to [illegible] his investigations on into North China, but while in [illegible] was ordered to report to Chungking.

Tolstoy obeyed, and upon his arrival in August 1943 [illegible] General Stilwell, bringing important political in- [illegible] in addition to topographical and economic information [illegible] data on possible airfields. Tolstoy learned for the [illegible] of the agreements that had been reached regarding [illegible] plans for reconnaissance in Northern China were,

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[illegible] the [illegible] to get Tai [illegible] in [illegible] near the [illegible] River.

TRAINING

Pursuant to the [illegible] agreement seven (7) training camps were to be established by the American parties (a naval unit and OSS) for the purpose of instructing agents furnished by the Chinese party and preparing them for specific missions in Japanese-occupied China. OSS instructors were assigned to several camps already set up by the Navy, or charged with getting [illegible] running new training areas. In each camp men were [illegible], trained and equipped for projected assignments.

Camp No. 3 at Linju, for example, was organized in October 1943 by Major (now Lt. Colonel) Aaron Bow and Captain (now Major) Gleason, both of OSS, and eighteen (18) naval [illegible] men trained in the United States by OSS. After the [illegible] physical installations had been completed, classes [illegible] in November with 395 Chinese students. They were trained [illegible], demolitions, unarmed combat, raids, ambushes, map reading, secret intelligence, etc., by the American instructors [illegible] were also given military and political training by Chinese instructors. A chosen party made up of graduate students was to [illegible] the sabotage of a coal mine behind Japanese lines [illegible] of training. This operation was eventually accomplished [illegible] direction.

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On 19 January 1944, a [illegible] school [illegible] [illegible] up the [illegible] [illegible] headquarters of SACO [illegible]. This school was under the command of Captain [illegible], [illegible], and the majority of the instructors were from the [illegible]. The purpose of this school was to organize in occupied China a network of [illegible] agents charged with reporting military and general intelligence by radio. Twenty-three of the students became skilled radio operators. Training was completed [illegible] March.

Up to October 1944, the OSS group based on Chungking numbered some thirty-six (36) officers and enlisted men. An advance base for the conduct of subversive psychological warfare was established by the MO branch of OSS, and a small Research and Analysis unit for the reception, analysis and distribution of intelligence functioned in Chungking.

Progress at the various camps was never entirely satisfactory to the OSS instructors. The quality and the enthusiasm of the students was not always of the highest; instructors were not permitted to supervise graduates in any special assignments; and the OSS men never could tell just where they stood with General Tai Li, the Chinese representative on SACO. Nevertheless, in spite of difficulties and delays, several hundred Chinese soldiers did receive valuable training which, in some cases at least, it is known was put to good use.



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[illegible]

[illegible] a Thai, was in [illegible]

[illegible] (Detachment) [illegible]

[illegible] equipment, arms, [illegible] and medical supplies had been

[illegible] and after a period of training in the United States,

[illegible] group was sent for the Orient, arriving at Bombay in

[illegible] after a lengthy and roundabout journey. [illegible]

[illegible] proceeded to the Det. 101 base at Nazira, Assam, for

[illegible] instruction. Because of uncertainty regarding the

[illegible] situation in SACO, the group was held for a time in Assam,

[illegible] the [illegible] season of 1943 the Thai unit lived miserably

[illegible] training for they knew not what, and

[illegible] the leech-infested jungles of the Naga Hills.

[illegible] was hospitalized for malaria, and finally in the

[illegible] the weary unit was moved to Dibrugarh.

[illegible] to proceed towards Thailand, but on

[illegible] they were ordered to Chungking where they [illegible] discovered

[illegible] under the control of SACO.

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[illegible] and

of the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

having at last [illegible] South China [illegible] and

[illegible]

[illegible] succeeded in establishing excellent liaison with [illegible]

[illegible] and in this way learned that an air group was being

[illegible] at Szemao in South China. In the course of time, per-

[illegible] was obtained to transport the group to Szemao where

[illegible] to establish a forward base from which their [illegible]

[illegible] into Thailand. Finally on 18 January 1944, 15

[illegible] when they had begun their long trek to

[illegible] Thailand, [illegible], Smith, and the rest of the group got under

[illegible] of six planes provided by the 14th Air Force

[illegible] supplies. On 27 February the first group

[illegible] for the Indo-China frontier. Forty-eight hours

[illegible] party set out and the two parties joined forces

[illegible], but whenever they tried to start over the border,

[illegible] under General Tai Li (director of OACO), instead of

[illegible] Thailand, offered excuses to prevent their

[illegible] eventually worked out with the help of a

[illegible] knowledge of the country and its people proved

[illegible] a unit of four men equipped with radios

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[illegible] group [illegible]
[illegible] with those in the field. [illegible]
[illegible] this contact was [illegible], but
[illegible] were maintained and much valuable
intelligence [illegible].

OSS is the first Allied intelligence agency to penetrate enemy occupied Thailand, whence OSS-trained agents are now sending out intelligence obtained from high military and political sources.

[illegible]

In the spring of 1943, OSS requested the French military authorities in North Africa to provide this organization with French officers for activities in Indo-China. Lt. Comdr. Meynier, then on the staff of General Giraud, was designated for this job and his orders were later co-signed by General Charles de Gaulle. From the outset Meynier made it clear that he would recruit a unit of several French officers and about [illegible] native soldiers. The group was trained in a U. S. military camp near Algiers and reached Chungking in the fall of 1943, when they were assigned to a SACO training area.

However, the wife of Comdr. Meynier was to be the key figure in his operations because she was an Annamite princess and [illegible] whose uncles were among the most powerful and influential individuals in Indo-China. Unfortunately, Madame



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[illegible] Hanoi [illegible] before the [illegible] could hope to succeed. [illegible] pressed quick action.

The rescue of Madame Meynier was a thrilling and costly adventure. Generals Giraud and DeGaulle provided a French Commando Unit which landed in France in July and took the lady out of an internment camp, and the British supplied a light plane which flew her to Great Britain where she was met by Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador to England. Madame Meynier was then brought to Cairo early in August and soon thereafter joined her husband. The episode cost the lives of three British and seven French soldiers but Giraud thought the price none too high because of the great power this woman might wield among the peoples of Indo-China.

About this time, however, French political complications set in, and to these were soon added disturbances of a personal nature. Much of the trouble hinged on the fact that the Meynier Group had been assembled under Giraud's auspices before the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation in Algiers which recognized DeGaulle's leadership. The Chinese Foreign Office, however, was unwilling to break completely with Giraud for fear such a move would be detrimental to their interests in Indo-China. Consequently, the OSS-sponsored Meynier mission was caught in a cross-fire. If it were openly pro-DeGaulle, it would

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[illegible] Commander, [illegible] to which [illegible] direction.

After long [illegible] were [illegible] straightened out, [illegible] control by mutual agreement and OSS [illegible] connections with it thereafter.

AGFRTS

In February 1944 two OSS officers, later joined by a third officer and an enlisted man, were attached to the Headquarters of the Fourteenth Air Force in Kunming for duty with the [illegible] section. This staff was a Research and Analysis unit, [illegible] satisfactory that the Fourteenth Air Force [illegible] it increasingly for basic information on the [illegible] of enemy targets of economic importance in occupied [illegible] Japan's inner zone.

The Air Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff (AGFRTS) [illegible] activated [illegible] April 1944 for operations in servicing [illegible] Force in the First, Third, Fourth, [illegible] and Ninth war areas of China. Training schools for [illegible] were established for the purpose of building [illegible] networks in enemy-controlled territory. These [illegible] who were recalled from earlier assignments to



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[illegible] more efficient [illegible] facilities and the [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible].

[illegible]

By late [illegible] of 1946, OSS [illegible] its [illegible] operational [illegible], [illegible] communication with the [illegible] military [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] of intelligence, [illegible] information [illegible], weather reporting, [illegible] order, and in particular [illegible] intelligence used in the pinpointing of targets for [illegible]. [illegible] Force operating in support of the Chinese [illegible] establishing agents with radio sets behind the [illegible], and by setting up a radio communication net, [illegible] the [illegible] of useful intelligence to Head[illegible] and considerably accelerated its flow.

[illegible] mobile combat liaison teams, establishing [illegible] friendly aircraft, guided them in [illegible] attacks which killed many thousands [illegible] valuable equipment. Indications [illegible] industrial plans were reported by AGFRTS [illegible] similar sights were obtained from aerial [illegible] reconnaissance conducted to verify the ground [illegible].

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[illegible]

the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] in the [illegible]

[illegible] among their students. [illegible]

[illegible] for the [illegible] front [illegible]

[illegible] cavalry unit about to cross the river. The [illegible] in charge radioed a message, twice in code, then in [illegible], over and over again [illegible] hours to be absolutely sure it [illegible] the Fourteenth Air Force. Several planes took off and [illegible] of the cavalry unit as it was about to enter the [illegible]. The Chinese army gave credit for 9,000 Japs destroyed, [illegible], according to the OSS commanding officer, may have [illegible] exaggeration, but certainly not a large one. Thousands [illegible] were destroyed."

On 11 June the second private relayed an agent's report [illegible] Japanese troops were crossing the Siang River in sampans [illegible] Hsin Shan. He sent a message to the Fourteenth [illegible]. Results were even more immediate in this case [illegible] already in the air was contacted and sent to the [illegible] proved to be double-decked troop barges. [illegible] message came back "sorry fellow, we missed [illegible]. [illegible] Chinese report relayed by Colonel (now



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[illegible]

[illegible] air support and to designate targets for air attack. [illegible] valuable tactical intelligence [illegible] the Air Force [illegible] enemy advance during the Changsha-Hengyang-Kweilin [illegible]

[illegible]

OSS demolitions teams were also active in the same [illegible]. On 17 September 1944, Major [illegible] of OSS, [illegible] was personally requested by Brigadier General Clinton [illegible] to demolish all roads in front of the Japanese drive [illegible] Kweilin and Liuchow.

Two demolitions teams were organized under Captains Frank A. Gleason and Captain Stanley A. Staiger with Air Force, [illegible] Naval personnel. These teams set out from Liuchow on [illegible]. By 10 October they reported the destruction of [illegible] bridges and the damaging of two others, the [illegible] of four ferries and the establishment of four [illegible], one of them by a landslide started by explosives. [illegible] of bridges and roads had been "prepared,"

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[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] of the Japanese [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the Tushan-Sayan area.

In other areas Chinese guerrilla bands were contacted by OSS men. As previously mentioned, many of them were given training in OSS camps, equipped with weapons and demolitions, and in certain cases supplied with subversive literature to be disseminated in enemy-held territory. In exchange the guerrillas rendered many services, including hairbreadth rescues of Fourteenth Air Force airmen forced down in Japanese-occupied areas. In one instance, guerrillas carrying a pilot in an enclosed sedan chair ran into a column of Jap infantry and had to wait by the roadside as they filed by so near that the pilot could have reached through the curtains of his chair and touched the [illegible] of the marching soldiers.

Lt. Comdr. Joseph Roberts, USNR, of OSS, trained guerrilla bands in the Canton area in the summer of 1944. He [illegible] guerrilla leader known as the "Madman" and ten of his [illegible] in the use of demolitions. When the Madman had completed [illegible], he set out to blow up a military locomotive and some [illegible] on the Canton-Kowloon railroad. On the way, he and his guerrillas attacked five Jap military trucks containing 40 Japs.

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[illegible] killed [illegible]

wounded. [illegible]

[illegible] what conditions [illegible]

[illegible] trains [illegible]

[illegible] this work, fearing that [illegible]

[illegible] reprisals to nearby civilians. Instead he decided

to blow up planes. Accordingly, he sent [illegible]

[illegible] five men blew up and destroyed two Jap bombers. Later

[illegible] favorable conditions, he returned to the [illegible]

railroad and blew it up in 10 places.

[illegible] greatest demolition job was the blowing

[illegible] coal mine, the only one in Kwangtung province

[illegible] enemy consumption. His men set their charges

[illegible] they destroyed the generator, flattened [illegible]

[illegible] and blocked all seven shafts. Thus in a

[illegible], these OSS-trained demolitions experts deprived

[illegible] six months of their only local supply of coal for

[illegible] power stations, and railroads vital to

[illegible] an increased burden on overstrained Jap

[illegible] particularly pleased," wrote Roberts, "because

[illegible] tried to destroy it seven months

[illegible] failed."

[illegible] became evident that the Chinese

[illegible] longer capable of offering effective resistance

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[illegible]

[illegible] Jap military units and social [illegible] servants and [illegible] Jap officials. They [illegible] controlled the policy of [illegible]-operated companies [illegible] the Japanese [illegible] organization. Before [illegible] over 100 Japanese soldiers had been [illegible] in a vain effort to [illegible] the spread of [illegible]

[illegible] intelligence services in particular did their part. [illegible] 1943, AGFRTS, engaged in ground intelligence, [illegible] and enemy spotting, was contributing over [illegible] of the intelligence received by the 14th Air Force [illegible] military sources. The Tenth Weather Squadron received [illegible] daily average of 20 weather reports which were [illegible] the Kunming weather map within 30 minutes after [illegible] Coast-watchers in southern China in one instance [illegible] convoy of Jap vessels; the report was relayed to [illegible] submarines, and the entire group was sunk. The

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[illegible]

[illegible] of [illegible] New Delhi [illegible] in the CBI Theater [illegible] officers, all of [illegible] the CBI Headquarters [illegible] Dec. [illegible] moved to [illegible] Road [illegible] Lord Louis Mountbatten's [illegible] located in New Delhi until April [illegible] was assigned to this [illegible] Liaison Service Officer ([illegible] 1945), [illegible] Det. 404, was also based in New Delhi. In April [illegible] moved to Kandy, Ceylon, with the SEAC Headquarters, [illegible] small rear-echelon unit.)

The OSS/CBI New Delhi unit was officially established [illegible] on 16 March 1944, with an authorized strength of [illegible] (12) officers and three (3) enlisted men. The [illegible] Analysis Branch of OSS furnished the first and [illegible] of this Detachment, but in the course of [illegible] branches of OSS were represented. Beginning in May [illegible] grew in size so that on 26 October 1944, its [illegible] twenty (20) officers, fifteen (15) enlisted men,

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[illegible] SECRET

As mentioned in the [illegible] of [illegible] report, OSS in the [illegible] was [illegible] in [illegible] 194[illegible] [illegible] OSS/CBI and OSS/SEAC [illegible] was under the command of Col. Richard P. Heppner who was assigned to the South East Asia Command as Strategic Services Officer. [illegible] became known as Det. 404.

This agency was responsible to Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander, SEA. On 18 December 1943, Admiral Mountbatten established the P Division and assigned it the duty of approving and coordinating the plans and activities of all quasi-military and irregular forces in the SEAC Theater. His directive [illegible] in an order to OSS from OSS headquarters, and OSS units [illegible] carefully complied with these instructions.

The purpose of Det. 404 was to obtain intelligence in all parts of the theater, execute maritime operations of a coup-de-main type [illegible] planes and motor boats, carry on morale subversion [illegible] special tactics and weapons. OSS/SEAC [illegible] at Trincomalee and in Colombo; and in January, [illegible] training a number of Indonesian agents. Early in [illegible] acquired a headquarters site in Kandy, began [illegible] operational groups at Galle, and subsequently [illegible] at [illegible] and a forward base at Chittagong.

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A move to the Headquarters in Kandy occurred in May, but a rear echelon was maintained in New Delhi.

Of all operations launched by OSS/SEAC, the most interesting and fruitful was the infiltration of Thailand. In the summer of 1944, when General Stilwell temporarily replaced Lord Mountbatten as Allied Supreme Commander in SEAC, Col. Heppner submitted an OSS plan for the penetration of that country. The General took keen interest in the proposals, made a number of concrete suggestions and gave indispensable aid in getting the project under way.

In October, two OSS-trained native Thai agents were successfully parachuted into their home country, where they established contacts and began radioing military and political intelligence hitherto unavailable, including virtually complete order of battle information on Japanese troops in Thailand.

Another OSS project which began during General Stilwell's command in SEAC was full-scale assistance to the British 15th Corps fighting on the Arakan coast. Under Major [illegible] Ferr, a complete 130-man OSS team reached the Arakan in December 1944. Quickly establishing themselves, they ran successful reconnaissance raids into enemy territory.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

August 12, 1943

INTERNAL USE:

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Donald C. McKay DCM.

SUBJECT: PW Weekly Article - Hitler's Displacement

I am sending you herewith an article which will appear in tomorrow's PW Weekly, which is based on a memorandum by Franz Neumann of the Central European Section. It is an analysis of the significance of the alleged displacement of Hitler, and I felt that it would be of interest to you in connection with the forthcoming conference. A copy is being sent to Edward Mason [illegible].

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## [illegible] CLASS AND A NEGOTIATED PEACE

[illegible] the truth of recent reports about the establishment of the Goering-Keitel-Doenitz triumvirate, [illegible] would seem to be in the cards. As the [illegible] become increasingly persuaded of the [illegible] defeat, their thoughts will inevitably turn [illegible] "escaping" from Nazism and making contact with [illegible]. This article, by an unusually acute [illegible], explores some of the possible roads by which [illegible] class may maneuver itself into a peace-[illegible].

[illegible] from the Research and Analysis Branch.

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The German ruling groups are becoming slowly convinced that the military war is lost. Some fanatic Nazis, preferring to die honorably rather than live in humiliation, may favor desperate measures, such as an invasion of Britain. But the Army, the Industrialists and the Junkers, having conceded that they have lost the war, must now stake their power and position on the chance of winning the peace. If, as Clausewitz observed, war is the continuation of politics by other means, it is equally true that politics may be the continuation of war by other means.

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Divide and Conquer

Two lines of political strategy are open to the [illegible]: divisionism within the individual United [illegible]tions, and divisionism among the collective United [illegible]tions. The first line has been tried and exhausted. [illegible] failures of Sir Oswald Mosley, of the American [illegible]st Committee, of the army of General Vlasov have [illegible] the essential hopelessness of attacks on the [illegible] of the Allied nations with the aim of bringing anti-[illegible]'s into power. The second strategy -- the [illegible]n of the United Nations, and the negotiation of [illegible] with the western democracies -- [illegible] objective of German political [illegible].

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Germany may hope to achieve this end by convincing [illegible] of the persistence of the policy of capitalist encirclement, or by convincing Britain and America of the dangers of the Bolshevization of Europe. But because [illegible] and the western democracies have committed [illegible] not to deal with Hitler and the Nazi Party, the [illegible] are faced with the problem of devising for negotiation [illegible] some new and plausible constitutional [illegible] will deceive the United Nations without actually [illegible] the basic power arrangements of the Nazi system. [illegible] light that the reported establishment of the [illegible] must be viewed.

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[illegible] in Germany

[illegible] triumvirate, if it exists, does not mean the [illegible] of an agency for bargaining immediately with the [illegible] or with Russia. The presence of Goering, the [illegible] of [illegible] and Warsaw, and of such Nazi puppets as [illegible] and Doenitz, would discourage even the [illegible] in the western democracies most determined [illegible] to an end. But it is unlikely that the [illegible] itself acceptable to the United Nations, [illegible] made no move to dispense with Hitler and [illegible].

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The triumvirate must further be considered as an indispensable first step toward further constitutional changes. The objective of these changes will be to endow the Nazi system with quasi-constitutional character intended to supply a foundation for peace dealings.

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The Nazi Party

The first problem which will arise in aiming toward this objective is the place of the Nazi Party. The ruling groups are undoubtedly convinced that the home front cannot be kept in order without a totalitarian party. The revolution of 1918 proved to the Army its incapacity to provide leadership for the home front, and the abolition of the Party would inevitable give rise to desertions, tendency to strikes, to peace demonstrations, eventually to internal disintegration. A political reorganization under the auspices of the present ruling groups will undoubtedly continue to rely on the Nazi Party as a means of control in the masses. But it will also probably compel a change in the status of the party within the framework of the totalitarian state.

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German Political Anomalies

The problem of redefining the status of the Party is complicated by the essential political shapelessness of the Nazi system. Hitler has always resisted an institutionalization of political leadership in Germany, fearing that such institutions would be used as an instrument against him. Thus the Nazi system never had a supreme policy-making body, comparable to the Grand Council of Italian Fascism, or to the monarch and his advisers. (Hitler's instinct was justified by the way in which those two institutions finally turned on the hand that fed them). Some Nazi leaders, especially [illegible], vainly urged the creation of a National Socialist Cabinet as the supreme organ of the Reich. But this project died through; and the other high-level consultative bodies, such as the Reich Cabinet, the Privy Cabinet Council, [illegible], the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, were impotent. On the other hand, the Party, as

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"the bearer of the political will of the state," is considered to be supreme over the civil service and the Army.

Future Political Changes

But as the shortcomings of the political system and the bureaucracy of the Party continue, Germany cannot have a bargain successfully with the western powers or with Russia. The problem is to initiate a sort of political readjustment, which will "constitutionalize" the system and withdraw into the Party, while preserving the Party organization and controls. And it must achieve this transformation while Germany is still militarily strong enough to maintain order at home and have her military power in the peace dealings with Russia.

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The appointment of the triumvirate is a move toward these more significant political changes. It is conceivable, for example, that the Reichstag may be convened, that the offices of presidency and chancellorship may be divorced, and that [illegible] will assume the presidency, while a [illegible] of a high civil servant or a prominent banker [illegible] of [illegible] Chancellor. Some further [illegible] may be made: the reestablishment [illegible] by an upper house, or the reconstitution [illegible] and the [illegible] Council, all such new [illegible], industrialists, civil [illegible] and other "respectable" characters. [illegible] will not be dissolved, it will be [illegible] instrument of the state; thus [illegible] between state and Party.

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The Olive Branch

The cabinet with its chancellor will then sue for peace. It would have two main bargaining points: Hitler as president, and a still powerful military machine, and it would offer to sacrifice the first, and to withdraw the latter behind German frontiers.

If the western powers and Russia have not by then agreed upon a common policy toward Germany, some such offer may well succeed in dividing the United Nations.

The offer might first be addressed to Britain and France, it would be accompanied by the threat of a separate peace with Russia in case of rejection, and it would play on the fear of communism which exists in certain sections of the ~~ruling groups.~~

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But such a reconstituted German Government might equally well approach Russia first. The Free Germany Manifesto, with its insistence on a strong German state and a strong army, provides a foothold for such proposals. Russian war weariness, and the persistent suspicion of the democracies, may increase a disposition to deal with Germany, particularly if the new Government is composed of ~~[illegible]~~ generals like Brauchitsch and von [illegible], industrialists like Karl Lange, geopoliticians like Werner Daitz, who have championed the eastern orientation of German foreign policy.

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[illegible] is speculation, yet the probabilities [illegible] ruling class will willingly sacrifice its most [illegible] representatives in order to hold fast to the [illegible] of power; that considerations of preserving [illegible] "anarchy" may incline the victorious [illegible] with the power groups in the conquered [illegible] combination of predilections may [illegible] were the ruling class, by diplomatic [illegible] very near in making up an [illegible] of war. If Hitler [illegible] would seem natural that [illegible] to be modern Talleyrands.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

To: General Donovan

From: Henry Field

DATE: April 28, 1943

SUBJECT: Adolf Hitler's Conditional Parole in 1924

The attached document is stated to be a copy made some years ago of a document prepared by the Bavarian State Police, Munich, to the Ministry of the Interior, Munich.

HF.

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Y

BAVARIAN STATE POLICE, MUNICH

Munich, September 22, 1924

IV a.Nr.: 2427

Report to the Bavarian State Ministry
of the Interior, Munich

Re: The conditional parole of the writer ADOLF HITLER, of the veterinarian Dr. FRIEDRICH WEBER, and of the Lieutenant Colonel retd. HERMANN KRIEBEL

The State Police Department has already expressed its opinion in the report of May 8, 1924 to the effect that, in consideration of the temperament and energy, with which Hitler pursues his political ambitions, it is to be definitely assumed that he would not give up these ambitions even after his release from imprisonment; but that he will remain a continual danger for the inner and exterior security of the State. Until the present time no reason has been found which could have led the police department to a change of its former opinion.

If the police department takes the stand that Hitler and Dr. Weber should not be released on October 1, 1924, this decision is based on the following reasons: Even during the trial the three defendants have repeatedly declared that immediately upon their release they will again promote the National

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Socialist movement and that they will continue to work in the same manner as formerly. Hitler, Kriebel, and Dr. Weber are now as before the leaders of the dissolved para-military troops and the spiritual leaders of the now existing camouflaged front organizations. Therefore a release of the three named persons, even on conditional parole should not be considered. However, should the court unexpectedly grant a parole it would be compulsory for the given reason to deport Hitler as the soul of the entire nationalistic and racial movement in order to avoid the immediate danger to the Bavarian State. In respect to this I refer to my previous report of May 8, 1924 in which I fully explained the reasons or my request for Hitler's deportation from Bavaria.

The numerous riots committed by his followers until the time of the Putsch are to be accredited to his influence. The moment he is set free Hitler will, because of his energy, become immediately again the generator of repeated heavy riotous disturbances of the public order. He will continuously endanger the security of the State. Hitler will resume his political activities, and the hope of the nationalists and racists that he will succeed in removing the present disunity and the disunion among the officials of the para-military troops will

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be fulfilled. Hitler's influence on all nationalistic inclined - today he is more than before the soul of the entire movement - will again carry the entire movement forward. It will even absorb great masses of persons who are now foreign to his ranks and convert them to the idea of the National Socialist German Workers' Party. In order to accomplish this he will greatly revive the mass assemblies, he will organize demonstrations as before the Putsch, and we can surely expect such outbreaks as are still vivid in our memory. Hitler will again take up his relentless fight against the Government and not abstain from violations of the law even if he is to face the revocation of his parole.

Therefore it is completely immaterial whether, as expressed, he will take up his residence in Berlin or in the Mecklenburgs upon his release or whether he will remain in Munich itself.

(signed) illegible
The Director of the Bavarian State Police,
Munich

Note: Hitler's sentence for high treason: five years confinement in a fortress.
Served: four months and two weeks before the trial.
Begin of imprisonment: April 1, 1924.
Normal end of confinement: November 26, 1928.
Actual date of release: December 26, 1924.

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Hitler, Adolf
Proclamation 2/24
Nazi Party
Germany

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Col. William J. Donovan

DATE: March 6, 1943

FROM: Dr. Walter C. Langer

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Hitler's Proclamation to the National Socialist Party on the Anniversary of its Founding February 24, 1943

A psychoanalytical study of Hitler's Proclamation is scarcely feasible due to the fact that it was prepared in advance and read by another person. Furthermore, we have no way of knowing what Hitler actually said in this Proclamation. We have three versions at our disposal: (a) the short wave trans-ocean broadcast reported by AP appearing in the New York Times, Feb. 25, 1943; (b) long wave broadcasts in German from Oslo, presumably intended for the German troops in the Northern area; and (c) the Berlin press version broadcast on short wave in Morse code over DNB.

No two of these versions agree with each other, although the core of each is fundamentally the same. Obviously, the original proclamation was severely edited and whole paragraphs deleted. The AP version contains the essential core but due to the omitted paragraphs it seems, at first glance, like a jumble of disconnected thoughts. It is safe to assume that the original was not disjunctive and that the editing of the different versions was done with a definite goal in view. It is barely possible that the editing in the English version was designed to create the impression that

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Hitler's mental condition is far more serious than it is in reality. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand why some of the paragraphs appearing in the German versions should be omitted since they contain no incriminating material.

Even the Berlin press version, the longest and most complete of the three, shows a great many signs of tampering. In fact, it is far more difficult to understand the disparities between the two German versions than between either of these and the English. Perhaps the aim underlying the editing can best be illustrated by an examination of the same paragraph as it appeared in the three different versions.

Berlin Press version

When, in 1920, I announced in this hall the Party program and the decision to annihilate the enemies of our people, with all the fanaticism of which we were capable, I was a lonely and unknown man. Germany, however, was going through her deepest humiliation. The number of those who believed in her revival was negligible. The people who hoped for this to happen within our lifetime were fewer still. The feww followers who adhered to me at that time were faced by an almost crushing enemy superiority. For each 100 National Socialists, there were many millions of enemies, partly misguided, partly filled with hatred, not counting those of little faith who always wait for success before they bravely march alongside the victorious party.

Oslo version

Welch ein Unterschied gegenueber dem Kampf von Heute! Denn wie gross auch die Koalition unserer Feinde sein mag, sie ist an Macht geringer als die Kraft des Buendnisses der Voelker die sich der bolschewistisch-plutokratischen Vernichtung entgegenwerfen

AP version

The party has always been imbued with unbendable determination not to capitulate in any circumstances and not give up the struggle in any case before the conspiracy of our enemies has been snapped off at its core and been eliminated.

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Throughout the Berlin press version there is a great deal about the Party, its lowly beginnings, its loyalties and its undying devotion to Hitler. Interestingly enough, there is very little said about the Bolshevist menace on the Eastern front. The great enemy of Germany and the world in general is, as it was from the first days of the National Socialist Party, the Jew. The big difference is that now the Jew has allied himself with the Bolshevists and the democracies: "The same joint front of enemies we had to face in Germany now faces us again as an alliance between Jewish bankers of New York, the Jewish plutocratic ruling caste of London and the Jews in Moscow's Kremlin." Furthermore, "Above all, this war demonstrates incontrovertibly the complete identity of plutocracy and Bolshevism, as well as the eternal unchanging aim of all Jews which is to despoil nations and convert them into slaves."

In both of the German versions he has much more to say about the Jewish menace than is included in the AP text. He is liberal in his prophecies and as the war goes on, one nation after another will realize the Jewish menace and "just as the German people, realizing this danger, successfully fought the Jewish enemy and is now about to finish them off once and for all, just so nations will become increasingly conscious of their true [illegible] the war goes on and will finally make common cause against [illegible] which works for the destruction of them all."

Just as the Jew has always been responsible for all of Germany's misfortunes, so he is now responsible for the present war and the

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miseries of the German people. This is the whip Hitler has always used to arouse the German people to action and it is difficult to escape the impression that coming in this form at the present time can only mean new pogroms. In another place, the Berlin version says "For, thank Heaven, not only the Jews in London and New York have unambiguously stated what Fate has primarily intended for the German people; those in Moscow have done so, too. But we are determined to give them a no less clear reply."

If this impression is correct, it seems safe to assume that resentments within Germany are rising to a threatening degree. An examination of the past will reveal that terror against the Jews almost invariably follows a period of rising discontent within Germany. It is the old technique of redirecting aggressive impulses away from yourself to some scapegoat against which they can find unlimited expression.

All of the material against the Jews is contained in identical form in the Oslo version. However, much of the material pertaining to the Party is completely omitted. In place of it, we find grim determination and assurances that Germany is stronger and that German might is still superior. It is interesting, for example, that the Berlin version omits completely the following paragraph:

"As in the period of my struggle for power, every onslaught of our enemies and every one of their apparent successes made me grit my teeth even more firmly and become more determined never to stray from the way which leads sooner or later to my aim. Today, too, I am inspired by the same will-power to resolve to the last consequence the task which Fate has entrusted to me."

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In the English version, the frequent references to the Party are also omitted, as well as many personal references such as: "I, an unknown man, could not have started from this hall on my way through all obstacles." Rather, there is an attempt to create an impression of solidarity and determination, together with the paragraph on fanaticism which he has taught the people which does not appear in the Berlin version. Together with the aforementioned disjunctivity, one might suppose that the propagandists were trying to present him as an insane individual with a fixed determination never to yield and who is prepared to loose all kinds of terror. The Berlin version, on the other hand, tries to create the impression of the great leader who almost single-handed has guided his people away from destruction and that the present crisis is only one more obstacle in the road to ultimate success. Inasmuch as he has overcome many similar obstacles in the past, he is entitled to their loyalty in his present struggle and they can help him by wreaking vengeance on his enemies who are close at hand, namely, the saboteurs and the Jews.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan DATE: May 3, 1943

FROM: Edward H. Mason EHM.

SUBJECT:

The attached is one of the best analyses of the personality of Hitler I have ever seen.

The author, Edward Deuss, is a newspaper correspondent now attached to the NBC office in London. The memorandum probably should not be circulated without Deuss' consent.

Attachment.

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# MEMORANDUM

[illegible]: Professor Crane Brinton

[illegible]: Edward Deuss

[illegible]: Recollections of Adolf Hitler gained from personal contact, interviews and on airplane campaign tours with Hitler from September 1931 – May 1933.

The most obvious thing about Hitler is the blend of inborn [illegible] and masculine characteristics – a man on the borderline of [illegible], an incredible iron will subject to unfathomable fits of depres-[illegible] [illegible] self-disciplinarian who would not kill a fly except in [illegible] [illegible]tic-realist, an intuitive warrior, an ascetic adventurer.

I once asked him what he considered the most revealing state-[illegible] about himself in "Mein Kampf." He replied, "A short sentence at the [illegible] of the book (on page 11 in fact) in which I say that as a [illegible] learned the meaning of History." And the most important factor [illegible] early upbringing, he maintained, was Roman Catholicism, combined [illegible] the teachings of his intensely German-nationalist history teacher. [illegible] as a clash of opposing forces, and genius in man as [illegible] to synthesize these opposing forces for the purpose of evolv-[illegible] [illegible] powerful force. His personality is a synthesis of [illegible] [illegible], of Marxian materialism and metaphysics. National [illegible] was always proud of describing as a synthesis of National-[illegible]. His appeal to the German people based on this synthesis,

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[illegible] the Junker general stomping [illegible] Germany on behalf of [illegible] would have been regarded as a joke, but the [illegible] no such misgivings.

The [illegible] of history, for him, consisted of deductions from [illegible] age-old abiding problem — the rise and decline of [illegible]. His faith in himself and his hopes for Germany rested on [illegible] that the great imperialist powers were subjected to a cyclical [illegible] which presented Germany with an opportunity. His job was to mold [illegible] Germany to claim the heritage of the empires at the [illegible] greatest weakness. He has always made much of the fact [illegible] "world was divided" last time in the 17th, 18th and 19th [illegible] Germany was compelled to look on helplessly because torn by in- [illegible] does not subscribe to Carlyle's view that personalities [illegible] he believes that personalities appearing on the scene at [illegible] can shape the destiny of their countries. Leaders may [illegible] by purely materialistic considerations but the masses of the [illegible] only when moved by idealistic impulses. These idealisms [illegible] majority of cases been manufactured by those seeking or hold- [illegible] express purpose, but those who seek have a chance of such [illegible] new religion, while those who struggle to hold must rely [illegible] refurbished.

[illegible] this sense, he recognized that the only serious contender for [illegible] was the new idealism of Bolshevism. The new German idealism [illegible] might was to be based had to exert an appeal [illegible] the Bolshevism.

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[illegible] world situation, he was guided by [illegible]

[illegible] before all to the [illegible]

[illegible] is shown by a conversation I had

[illegible] at Budapest. I asked him

[illegible] more convincing reasons, for

[illegible] outlined in "Mein Kampf." [illegible]

[illegible] if he were being subjected to a [illegible]

[illegible] "Yes, the [illegible]

[illegible] continued, "whenever a people [illegible]

[illegible] (I interjected: [illegible]

[illegible] the barbarians,") that in building a wall

[illegible] nation is decadent. Look at the

[illegible] look at the great wall of China. [illegible]

[illegible] beginning of the downfall of [illegible]

[illegible] he not only confessed his intention to

[illegible] that France would fall [illegible]

[illegible] until the [illegible]

[illegible] of the European situation in 1939 (and

[illegible] makes his conduct of the

[illegible] the West as decadent and [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] year, occupying Poland and then striking

[illegible] would not bother him with a [illegible]

[illegible] why he failed to [illegible]

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[illegible] it is difficult to talk [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] of [illegible] his lack of [illegible], his [illegible] his [illegible]. Perhaps [illegible] himself into [illegible] by sheer will power. He [illegible] that Germany had a future and that he could make him [illegible] his country. [illegible] his heart and [illegible] made himself into a public speaker because he felt that the [illegible] more potent than the written. Handicaps which he could [illegible] were bent to his advantage. Not being a hail fellow well met, [illegible] for a strong, silent mystical character. [illegible] when select groups of Nazi mothers pushed their little [illegible] at him with bouquets on the airdrome. I never once saw [illegible] of those tokens on the head, ask their age or whether [illegible]. He took the bouquets, usually wild or garden flowers, [illegible], gave a limp salute with his right, and handed the flowers [illegible] his bodyguard, Schaub, who carried two revolvers under his [illegible].

[illegible] greater appeal to women than men was everywhere [illegible]. Groups of women of all ages used to form flocks of guardian [illegible] over him all night in the lobbys of hotels while he slept [illegible]. In Flensburg in the summer of 1932 three flaxen-haired [illegible] of the three Nazi district leaders [illegible] to Brueckner;

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[illegible] and deafness, hoping for the chance of looking the Führer in the eye." The Führer consented and the girls, all over 16, were ushered into Hitler's hotel room. They went in single file, except [illegible] defiled just inside the room, and halted, shouting Heil Hitler. Hitler advanced from the other end of the room to about a pace in front of the squad, clicked his heels and saluted. Then there was a long, rather embarrassing pause (the predicament of looking the Führer in the eye) lasting about half a minute. Hitler saluted again and a smile [illegible]. The girls saluted, [illegible] and then marched out of the room. Just outside they leaped up, threw their arms about [illegible]'s neck (he is six feet four) and kissed him all over his head. [illegible] were hysterical; in fact they were almost frothing at the mouth, [illegible] hysterical with joy. Inside the room not a single word other than Heil Hitler had been spoken. They did literally nothing but look the Führer in the eye and yet, as they said over and over again [illegible] would remain the greatest of their lives. Waters naturally [illegible] to run deep. Brückner's comment to me later [illegible] went very well, don't you think?"

[illegible] he molded himself into the leader he thought [illegible] carry his people with him. And in the process he sought to avoid [illegible]. He always went about as if wrapped in thought. He [illegible]. A high ranking medical man [illegible] first airplane trip. He advised me never to ask [illegible] more than one or two questions at a time and never to bother him [illegible] the hands. The questions should be challenging

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[illegible] to make him lose himself in an oration. He was so modest about [illegible] Hitler. In fact, Hitler was an extremely shy person to know well. [illegible] interview, discreetly worded but containing what [illegible] were the aims and ultimate purposes of the Nazi movement [illegible]. He sent the interview back with a note of apology [illegible] one word.

## Asceticism

[illegible] has been written concerning Hitler's being a teetotaller, [illegible] a vegetarian. He at that time slept not more than four [illegible] a night, ate sparingly and seemed to live on his nerves, or [illegible] said, on his spirit. Flying frightened him yet he put up with it [illegible] the only way he could get around quickly to all the out-of- [illegible] of Germany. He couldn't bear to look down out of the [illegible] in the middle because he thought it safest. On these [illegible] he spoke an average of five times a day, a total of at least six hours. [illegible] restaurant, consisted of two slices of [illegible] bread and a glass of milk. Since he ate in ten minutes, all other [illegible] stuff their pockets with sandwiches.

[illegible] in August, 193[illegible], the local Nazis presented [illegible] of canned sprats. The ever-hungry [illegible] on the lid as the airplane was taking off, [illegible] to Hitler. The Fuehrer peered at the artistically- [illegible] what they were. [illegible] assured him that the [illegible] "How am I supposed to eat [illegible]," asked the astonished [illegible], "you take one

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His attitude towards them was curiously, purely utilitarian. He [illegible] seemed to want any one of them indispensable. He knew that they [illegible] a disparate group of thugs, gangsters and high-minded idealists, [illegible] he exploited for the benefit of the cause. He felt [illegible] needed thugs to kill the opposition and idealists to win over the [illegible]. Each one of them was pigeon-holed in his mind for a particular job. [illegible] for a particular purpose, they swore an oath of personal [illegible] to him and if they did their jobs well they remained. [illegible] were not ends in themselves. The cause counted. Personal likes [illegible] were never taken into consideration. He didn't care for friends [illegible] loyalty and ability. Nor did he like flunkies. [illegible] from any of his followers would have made him suspicious. [illegible] him as the son of God to the masses, that was another [illegible] even then he never bothered so much about what they said as [illegible] whether the people believed it.

[illegible] always respected others' superior specialized [illegible] training or education. If, for example, his pilot [illegible] weather reports were unfavorable and a flight would be dangerous, [illegible] calling off. Formal conferences on matters of [illegible] were [illegible] exceedingly stormy. But Hitler held his [illegible] themselves out and the participants became [illegible]. Then he had the last word, not in any [illegible] sense but as [illegible] listened to all the arguments. As likely as not

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[illegible] after a rather slow and halted beginning. Brueckner [illegible] about three minutes from the beginning of the speech.

[illegible] Brueckner, seated on the platform, showed me his watch [illegible] Hitler began speaking and asked me to note the time. About [illegible] minutes later Brueckner nudged me. Hitler had pushed [illegible], fingers extended, upwards along the side of his head and started [illegible] for reasons wholly unrelated to the content of his speech. [illegible] Brueckner, "the holy ghost has taken hold of him." That [illegible] when men and women began to faint and were carried off [illegible] stretcher bearers.

Hitler [illegible] seemed pleased at the plaudits of the crowd but [illegible] as if to say, "the poor saps are being taken in." [illegible] as so many sheep. They have always in his mind [illegible] almost always profane, but whatever the cause the leader [illegible] effort to impress [illegible] on the masses that God has thus commanded and [illegible] His image, though the truth be the reverse. The secret of [illegible] not in his but in history.

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[illegible]

February 10, 194[illegible]

[illegible] Kimbel

Pursuant to your memorandum of January 29, we have received the following communication from Mr. E. V. Polutnik, Room 114, of the Department of State:

"Reference is made to your memorandum of January 29th requesting that any information which the Department may have on the character, habits, life history, etc., of Hitler be placed at the disposal of the Office of Strategic Services.

"I have now procured a rather large file of documents which pertain to Hitler, and I shall be pleased to make it available for the examination of a representative of the Office of Strategic Services whenever such representative finds it convenient to call."

If you will let me know when it would be [illegible] you to study this material in Mr. [illegible], I shall be glad to make an appointment.

W. A. K[illegible]

[illegible] Donovan [illegible]

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Germany 1941
Hitler to be assassinated
Inspection Trip
SECRET
X Hitler & X France

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan DATE: January 13, 1941

FROM: Florimond D. Duke

SUBJECT: Report of Hitler's recent inspection.

From a source considered most reliable I learned today that last week Hitler himself made a personal inspection along the Spanish, French border. He came from Marseilles and inspected the headquarters near Perpignan.

Usually on such inspections there is great fanfare for all the soldiers are anxious to see Hitler. This time everything was most secret with no flags on Hitler's car whatsoever. He was preceded by three or four large trucks filled with S.S. troops. These troops arrived at the headquarters an hour before Hitler. All the officers were completely taken by surprise at this inspection and were relieved of their revolvers. Hitler was in extremely bad humor and entered the General's headquarters without even shaking hands with the General. The General stood in the opposite corner of the room where Hitler sat.

On leaving this Army headquarters, Hitler instead of going further west along the coast of France or toward Bordeau, he proceeded directly north.

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It is also reported that the landing barges and small canal boats that were concentrated on the coast of France a year ago and had been allowed to sift down the canals into the interior and southern part of France are all moving north again.

It is the impression of the source that Hitler being very upset and "madder" than usual may be planning an attack on England, as he had once before said last October that he would "sink the airplane carrier", meaning England. It is entirely possible that Hitler will make a big noise about the defense of Tunisia and indicate that he is doing everything to put up a big fight there, when in reality these indications seem to point to an attack on England. He has also moved the parachute troops that were in the southern part of France to the north.

All citizens of Alsace-Lorraine have been made citizens of Germany and Hitler has taken every man and either put him in the Army or moved him into the factories of Germany.

F.D.D.

CC: Major David Bruce

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: William L. Langer

DATE: May 25, 1942

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Hitler's Speech of April 28, 1942

Supplementing my memorandum to you of May 14th, I am now pleased to attach a memorandum which my brother, Walter C. Langer, has prepared at my request, entitled ANALYSIS OF HITLER'S SPEECH OF APRIL 28, 1942.

I am sure you will be interested in reading this.

William L. Langer
Director of Research

Attachment

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MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. William L. Langer

From: Walter C. Langer

Subject: Analysis of Hitler's Speech of April 26, 1942

I have worked over Hitler's speech of April 26, 1942 in considerable detail with several of my colleagues. We are agreed that the speech is rather atypical for Hitler. It lacks the effusiveness to which we have become accustomed. There are no emotional outbursts and few vituperations. Much of the cockiness is gone and there is no mention of the superiority of German arms or equipment, sufficiency of food or raw materials and no claim of victory in the near future. The speaker gives the impression of being on the defensive and appears as a modest, cautious and even apologetic individual. He admits that there is and has been dissension in Germany and "requests" that power be granted him to deal with such dissension summarily. All this seems extremely foreign to the speaker in view of his past performances.

A careful analysis of the speech reveals that it is one of the most calculated that he has ever given. Every sentence has a direct bearing on the central theme and every lie and distortion is designed to serve a practical end rather than to induce a pleasant or satisfactory feeling in the listener. It is only after a careful study of the speech as a whole that its

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underlying purpose becomes clear. This primary purpose, from a psychoanalytic point of view, is to lay the foundations for a peace offer in the not too distant future.

To the casual reader or listener this purpose is not immediately obvious. On the contrary, the casual listener is inclined to conclude that the German morale is cracking and that Germany is in a bad way. Unquestionably, there is some dissension within Germany and some discontent with the progress of the war and particularly with the failure of the Russian campaign. There may be another reason which is even more telling, which we will consider later on. Why does Hitler speak of this dissension so openly? This is a double-edged technique the Nazis adopted early last Fall. On the one hand, it is designed to throw dust into the eyes of the people in the democracies in order to weaken their war effort by creating the impression that the war is almost over and there is no sense in exerting themselves or sacrificing too many of their liberties or luxuries. This is the old technique of lulling their opponents into inactivity. On the other hand, it is their modern technique of whipping the Germans into making a still greater war effort. Hitler and Goebbels both initiated this technique last Fall in speeches and writings in which superhuman efforts were demanded from the people on the grounds that if Germany wins it wins everything, but if it loses they can expect no mercy - the German nation would be annihilated and even Versailles

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would be generous in comparison with the peace which would follow this war. Therefore, whether they liked it or not, or whether they were in sympathy with the war or not, they were all in it now and they would all be judged together. This is the typical "partners in crime" code and their only hope of salvation in the future was to stick together and shoot it out to a successful conclusion. The result is that when the leaders now want greater effort, they talk about how badly things are going in order to arouse the fear of failure in the population.

It is possible that this section of the speech has still another purpose. It seems that Hitler goes out of his way to create the impression that he is not the ruthless individual of the past but a modest, honest, open, dutiful and law-abiding leader whose personal integrity is above question. His only concern is for the welfare of his people and the future of Germany. At heart he is really a peace-loving individual who has made every effort to spare his people the horrors of war, but since war was forced on him they must have complete faith in his leadership and share the sacrifices and observe their duties until he can restore peace to them. In other words, he avoids the gangster role and assumes the role of the benign leader to whom harsh measures are unpleasant but necessary in the interests of his people. It is logical to suppose that this new role is adopted now in order to make his future peace overtures more acceptable to the peoples of the United Nations.

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## Page 4 - Longer Memorandum

The long historical introduction concerning the British Empire was construed by us as material for the Fifth Columnists abroad. The general theme is that England is not strong now and never was strong; that her Empire was built up by cunning rather than by might. By means of her position she was able to utilize the disrupted state of Europe, a condition which she did not create, and turn it to her own advantage. The success of her theory of "balance of power" depends upon keeping European states fighting among themselves. England's entry into the last war was designed to maintain this condition on the Continent in order that her own position in the world could be preserved. She lacked the power to accomplish this in the last war and would have failed completely if she had not called the United States into the war at the eleventh hour to help her.

Even the last war sealed the doom of England. Instead of recognizing the inevitability of changes due to the evolutionary process, England was striving to maintain an earlier stage of development which was no longer tenable. The result was that on the one hand she wasted so much of her might in achieving victory in the last war that she has incapacitated herself for future challenges (Fumbumgering in the transcription should probably read "Vierhundertleg"). On the other hand, by calling to the United States for help she raised that country to a dominant position in world affairs - a position which England herself could not combat.

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This historical approach, designed to prove that England is on the skids and cannot hope to maintain her present position, is not new in Nazi propaganda. Such arguments were frequently advanced in 1940 and it is interesting to note that they were dropped when their peace overtures, after the collapse of France, had failed. It is now resurrected and reenforced by additional evidence to show that Europe is no longer divided against itself. On the contrary, it has reached an unbelievable state of unification in which Germans, Italians, Slovakians, Rumanians, Hungarians, Finns, Lithuanians, Letts and even Belgians, French, Ukrainians, etc., fight side by side in combatting an external and common danger. Against such an array of unified power, England's "balance of power" theory is ineffectual. Even if, with the help of the United States, she should happen to win she would win nothing, while if she loses she will lose everything. Her only hope of salvation, therefore, is to face the realities of the situation and work with this unified Europe rather than against it.

According to Hitler the factor which brought about this final unification of Europe was the recognition of the dangers inherent in the Jewish-Bolshevist combine which seeks to enslave the world. This section of the speech seems to be directive material for the Fifth Columnists in this country as well as in England. Capitalism and democracy are the Jews' stepping-stones to the enslavement of the people. By cultivating distrust and

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corruption they pave the way to anarchy and Bolshevism, etc. Roosevelt is a madman who has surrounded himself with Jewish advisers and is under their domination. We should get out of the war against Germany, which has never harmed us or intended to harm us, and clean our own house, etc. This is excellent material for a "whispering campaign" in the democracies.

It is important to note that in all of this material there is not a word against the English or the American people themselves. On the contrary, he even has a word of praise. The campaign is designed to wean the people from their leaders by fostering suspicion and distrust in their abilities and motives. Churchill is referred to as a cynical drunkard, while Roosevelt is a sick madman. They are greedy for power and fame and care not a whit for the interests of their people. They are not fit to rule great nations.

Contrast with this situation the one existing in Germany. Even as Hitler gives the speech, the German people with unanimous acclaim vote their leader unlimited power over the life and death of every German irrespective of their hard-earned rights. They are so thoroughly convinced of his sincerity, integrity and vision that they are willing to subordinate even the judiciary to his wishes and interpretations of what is best for Germany and the future of the German people. As he looks about him, Hitler sees nothing but honest and upright subordinates who will make history. They, as the leaders of the New Order, form a strange contrast to the leaders of the

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democracies who must find their encouragement in the most insignificant achievements. The impression is cultivated that the people of the democracies must wake up, rid themselves of their present leaders and select others with vision and integrity who can understand the trend of events and, presumably, make peace with Hitler when the proper time comes.

The section of the speech in which he asks for this unlimited power is interesting. At first glance one gets the impression that Hitler has turned over a new leaf and now requests power before he wields it. This would be a considerable divergence from his past performances, as for example in the Blood Purge, when he wielded the power first and got authorization afterwards. On more careful reading, however, we find that he wielded such power on the Eastern front last winter when he only believed that the German people had invested it in him. Likewise he tries to create the impression that the dissenters or slackers were few in numbers and that their failure to do their duty was solely the result of the hardships and tensions they had to endure. Then, however, we find him referring to wiping out whole groups who failed to live up to what was expected of them and we begin to wonder if the purge was not quite extensive.

His use of the term "selbstbestimmen" is significant. It is difficult to imagine anybody in Germany to whom this term was applicable who was not in the highest ranks of the military or the

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party and one who was not in close contact with Hitler himself. In other words, we can surmise from this remark that there are dissenters within the ranks of his closest advisers. One can imagine that this dissension is confined solely to the Russian campaign and its results. This is certainly cause for dissension but it hardly seems enough, by itself, to account for Hitler's attitude at this time when the Spring Offensive is about to begin. It may have other sources which we will consider in a moment.

In any case, it seems necessary for Hitler to hold this extraordinary power as a whip over the heads of some of his ranking officials. In order to justify his request for this extraordinary power he tries to create the impression that this is an extraordinary war and consequently must be fought by extraordinary means. The war is one of life or death for the German nation and its outcome will determine the destiny of the world for hundreds or thousands of years. A war involving such stakes can, of necessity, be determined only by a long and protracted struggle requiring more than ordinary courage and endurance. Defeat for the Germans would mean the slaughter of millions of people as it did in Russia. Everything must be sacrificed to prevent such an outcome in comparison with which the present state of the war effort, the partial starvation and the total domination of all activities is infinitely better than the consequences of giving in. From which the conclusion is to be drawn

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that the sacrifice of all acquired rights and submission to additional Nazi terror and lawlessness are the sole protection of the German people against the Bolshevist menace.

One could also surmise from his speech that Hitler does not propose to make his peace overtures in the near future. First the Fifth Columnists must do their work, then increased submarine warfare against England and then, perhaps, some concentrated bombings which will inflict untold misery on the people, who should then be amenable to his proposals. Also, perhaps, a few spectacular victories against the Russians, although one has the feeling that in this speech he is leaving loopholes for himself to make peace overtures even though he fails to defeat Russia.

One very important point remains for consideration, namely, his scanty references to Japan. He talks at length about the great achievements of Italy which are meagre in reality and makes little mention of the achievements of Japan which are impressive. One would expect, at this time, that he would magnify them rather than to diminish them. We must suppose that he has ulterior motives in not doing so. What are these motives? From the few remarks that he makes in this speech, it is impossible to say. We might suppose that in order to woo England he must soft-pedal Japan. If the British Empire is to remain intact as he implies, provided that it works with the New Order, it would require considerable settlement with Japan. Perhaps he does not feel that this is the time to talk

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of such a settlement. Or, again, we might suppose that his feeble references to Japan are designed to indicate to the English that he is ready to sell them down the river whenever England is ready to talk peace. He therefore treats them lightly as though they were unimportant to his future plans.

There is, however, another possibility which seems to me even more likely, namely, that Hitler and the leading Nazis are afraid of the growing power of Japan. It looks almost as if some of the ranking Nazis were beginning to question the wisdom of the alliance with Japan and her entry into the war. While Germany struggles to acquire relatively worthless territory in Europe at terrific costs, they see Japan acquiring the colonies, rich in raw materials, which Germany has always coveted, with comparatively small losses. At the time of Hitler's speech Japan stood on the doorstep of India which has for years been the dreamland of the Germans - Japan seizes the world's riches while Germany fights for worthless territory which may prove to be a liability rather than an asset. It is possible that the German leaders are beginning to wonder who will recover these territories from Japan when the war is ended and Germany, together with the other European nations, are exhausted.

It has long been known to psychoanalysts that one of the Germans' favorite defense mechanisms in propaganda is that known as projection. By means of this mechanism they project on to others their own wishes, ambitions and fears. The clearest example is to

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be found in connection with the Jews. By projection Hitler is able to accuse the Jews of planning all the things which he himself wants to do. May it not be that in the present instance he is projecting his own fears, anxieties and difficulties to the English? In one place he says that England has made a tremendous error in allying itself with the United States since in the end she will find her ally stronger than herself. The same may be true of Germany in respect of Japan. In another place he says of England that if she wins she wins nothing, while if she loses she loses everything. May this not be equally true of Germany in regard to things of value? Perhaps it is he who finds himself in the position of having sold Germany down the river to Japan and his advisers and ranking officials may be rebuking him for it.

When we view the speech in its entirety from this point of view, it begins to make sense. There is a reason for laying the foundations for peace overtures in the not too distant future. Certain it is that nowhere in the speech does Hitler lay any claim to credit for bringing Japan into the war. If everything were above-board we would expect this to be a feather in his cap. Instead of that we find that Japan's entry into the war was the result of the stupidity of the democracies. May this not be another case of projection? That all is not well is evidenced by the cool commentaries on Hitler's speech given by the Japanese radio in the days immediately following its delivery.

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Whatever the case may be, this latter point of view offers us an excellent opportunity for counter-propaganda to Germany. By reversing the whole picture and sending it back to Germany, I believe we will be striking close to doubts already existent in the minds of many Germans. While Hitler is exhausting the energies of Germany and its allies in combatting the menace of Bolshevism, he is paving the way for the Great Yellow Peril to sweep over Europe (although the latter need only be implied). It is our opinion that such an approach will tap latent anxieties which are far stronger than any connected with the Bolsheviets and help drive an opening wedge between the German people and their leaders.

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: William L. Langer DATE May 14, 1943

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Comments on Hitler's Speech of April 28, 1943

I am returning to you herewith Mr. Warburg's comments on Hitler's Speech together with comments prepared by Mr. Dorn and by Mr. Schorske. I think both you and Mr. Warburg will find these comments of some interest.

I might say that I took the trouble to read the German text of the speech myself and am inclined to agree with Mr. Dorn and Mr. Schorske that while it would be a great mistake to suppose that Hitler would parade before the world the growing weakness of Germany (if it exists) it does appear fairly clear that the Nazis are confronted with growing discouragement and disillusionment on the part of the German population. I think Mr. Schorske's remarks on Hitler's constantly changing interpretation of the present conflict are very much to the point and that Hitler finds it necessary to constantly advance some new argument to convince the German people of the necessity of the conflict.

William L. Langer
Director of Research

Attachments

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

RECEIVED
APR 28 1942
BRANCH OF RESEARCH & ANALYSIS

MEMORANDUM April 27, 1942

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

FROM: J. P. Warburg

SUBJECT: Hitler's Speech

The outstanding points about the Hitler speech seem to me these:

1. There seems to have been no good reason for making the speech except the necessity for dealing with the German internal situation.

(a) The whole first part seems to attempt to say to the German people: "I did not start this war. The British and the Jews did." The length of this section would indicate that there must be people in Germany who feel that this is Hitler's war and who are dissatisfied with it.

(b) The section which deals with the Russian campaign is defensive in nature. It seems in a way to apologize for certain severe measures which had to be taken, which clearly indicates that there was, if not mutiny, at least widespread dissatisfaction among the troops. We have had such stories of dissatisfaction from various sources.

(c) The promises that the railroads will work better, the supply organizations be more effective, etc. imply that they broke down during the winter.

(d) The violent denunciation of RAF bombings and the threat of reprisals seems to have been purely for German consumption, since this whole section was omitted from the English version transmitted to England. This section was therefore not intended to enlighten the British but to reassure the Germans. The implication is that the Germans are badly rattled by the RAF bombings.

2. It is notable that the speech contains no promise of victory in 1942, or, for that matter, any other time. It stresses the necessity for avoiding defeat, and breaks away from the assurance of previous speeches.

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3. The speech contains the flat statement that the outcome of this war will be settled on the Eastern front. This falls right into the line we have been taking of telling the Germans that unless Hitler succeeds in knocking the Russians out of the war this summer his defeat is certain.

4. It is notable that Hitler stressed the submarine as the weapon by which he would reduce England. There is no hint of invasion, and aerial warfare is only mentioned as a reprisal measure.

5. The speech shows a good deal of preoccupation about the Germanic raids.

6. The whole climax of the speech - his request for absolute power over every German - speaks for itself. Obviously Hitler has this power already. The fact that he made this strange demand to the Reichstag is a clear indication of some sort of trouble at home. The suspicion that this was a plant in order to create false hopes among the United Nations is probably not justified, because references to the home front and to the decree were omitted from most of the short wave summaries sent out to foreign countries.

7. Finally, it is interesting to note the [illegible] number of references to the Almighty and to [illegible], which may perhaps indicate that Hitler has lost [illegible] confidence in himself and in German arms.

Conclusion: I believe the speech warrants the [illegible] that Germany has suffered more heavily during the winter than we have been inclined to assume, that the [illegible] are themselves quite worried, and that they are [illegible] this spring and summer with a far less [illegible] and with less confidence than we have been [illegible].

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[illegible] OF APRIL 26, 1948.

[illegible]ay 15, 1948

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# HITLER'S SPEECH OF APRIL 26, 1942.

In his speech of April 26, 1942, Hitler requested the Reichstag to grant him extraordinary powers to curb special privilege and to punish the slackers impeding Germany's war effort. Most American press commentators have viewed this request as an indication that Hitler feels threatened by internal disintegration. The validity of this interpretation is open to serious doubt. The present level of German war production would not indicate any effective decline in German morale, nor is there any sign that Germany's lack of enthusiasm, present ever since the outbreak of war, has noticeably increased. Moreover, Hitler's request for more power must have impressed the German citizen as essentially meaningless. No German is so naive as to assume that Hitler has held, for at least six years, anything less than complete power. Even the courts of law, which Hitler particularly assails in his speech as defenders of unwarranted privilege, have long since been subject to the will of the Party.

An examination of Hitler's new appeal in the broader context of Germany's domestic propaganda line suggests a different interpretation of its meaning. Ever since the outbreak of war, the apathy of the German people has been widely recognized. In order to overcome

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the feeling of deep foreboding which was so widespread among Germans to whom the sufferings of the last war were still a living memory. Nazi propaganda concentrated on assuring the home front that it would not suffer in this war as it did in the last. The prosperity of the German citizen has been repeatedly contrasted to the starving rations of the English and to the utter frightfulness of the Russian citizen's life.

Although this propaganda probably helped to encourage the civilian population, there is reason to believe that it has had a contrary effect in the rank and file of the Army. The German press, particularly the Schwarze Korps, which enjoys a wide circulation in the Army, has lately been replete with articles condemning the home front for not assuming its full share of the burden. Even State and Party officials have not been spared by the Schwarze Korps in its criticisms of life behind the front.

It is apparent that the "home-front-prosperity" line was gone too far, and is proving a boomerang. It may have been cheering to the new recruit to know that folks back home were being cared for, but the soldier who is going through the hell of the Russian campaign can find little cheer in the assurance that life is relatively normal on the home front. The dogged assistance rendered

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by the Russian civilian population to the R... the German soldier what a "home" front could do in total war.

The articles in the Schwarze Korps and elsewhere have represented his point of view. Hitler himself is now taking up the cudgels for the common soldier. In his speech he describes at length the sufferings of the Army in the Russian campaign, in comparison with which the inconveniences on the home front are as naught. He went to the front partly to show the soldiers that he was sharing their sacrifice. Now he is demanding on their behalf that the civilian population do the same.

When the nation was growing anxious about the reversal in Russia, Hitler took over personal responsibility from the generals. He is now reassuring the Army by accepting full responsibility for the conduct of the ... front, a responsibility previously assigned to the Party.

...tler's request for new powers means that ...many will have to tighten its belt. It is no sign, however, that internal disintegration is setting in. Hitler is simply trying to overcome the effects of his earlier "home-peaceful" propaganda, and to apply in ... many ways of the lessons in total warfare which the ... front has taught him.

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Profoundly conscious of his role as [illegible] historical personality," Hitler rarely speaks to the world without discoursing at length upon the meaning of the War. His interpretations of the War, however, change with its course.

At the outbreak, he had conceived the meaning of the conflict in terms of issues which were essentially national in character. The solution of the Polish Corridor problem, the rectification of the last of the wrongs of Versailles; these were the reasons Hitler advanced for going to war. After the entrance of the Italians into the conflict, he explained the war as the struggle of the Have Not's against the Have's for an equal share in the wealth of the world.

In the present speech the latter interpretation is only alluded to in passing; the former is totally ignored. Hitler speaks now not simply as the leader of the Germans, not simply as the leader of the Have Not's, but as the leader of Europe. The emphasis he places on the necessity for European solidarity indicates that the "New Order" concept has assumed a new centrality in his thinking. This centrality clearly derives from his realization that without the full mobilization of Europe, he cannot successfully wage the two front war which threatens him. Hitler took the gamble of being able to defeat his foes one at a

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time. The fact that Russia's armies are still [illegible] and that the United States is now a full participant presents him with the live possibility of the very two-front situation which he sought to avoid. One may deduce from his high compliments to all the European nations which have aided him that he is well aware that the resources and manpower of Europe as well as those of Germany will be even more necessary when both fronts become a reality.

At the same time Hitler does not openly recognize the existence of a two front situation. In order to arouse his European followers, he concentrates exclusively on the Russian menace. He belittles the role of England in the war, and argues that she no longer represents a force in European politics. He implies, however, that her only hope for the survival of her Empire lies in cooperation with unified Europe. He ignores entirely the prowess of the United States. Our participation in the war is to him utterly incomprehensible, since he "does not see" how the interests of the United States are in any way involved in the conflict. He likewise argues that the United States will be the inheritor of the British Empire. This may be his last effort to divide the American people from its leaders and at the same time from the British Allies.

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The cardinal sin of Great Britain and the United States, according to Hitler, is that they are abettors of the Communist Revolution. He tries to show that both these powers are pursuing a policy contrary to their own interests as well as to that of civilization in general. It is in this effort that he arrives at a newly unified philosophy of the war designed to appeal to the middle class the world over. He casts his argument in terms of the Marxian dialectic, with which middle class European thought has been so largely tinctured.

The Jews occupy the center of the stage in Hitler's new theory. Their aim is, of course, to achieve world domination. Democracy provides them with the opportunity. In the democracies the Jews, at the expense of the indigenous population, are able to accrogate most of the wealth. They thus create a large oppressed proletariat which the Jews then exploit to subvert the existing social order. When revolution comes, the dialectic process reaches its final phase, in which the Jews take over political and economic power completely and exploit the enslaved peoples. Great Britain and the United States therefore represent the last phase of the Jewish-inspired class conflict. Under their Jewish leaders they are misguidedly fighting simply to preserve the possibility for world revolution. Hence it is entirely natural that they should be fighting at Russia's side.

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So intent is Hitler upon convincing the world that the war is to be viewed as a gigantic Communist plot, that he professes to see no meaning in the War before the outbreak of the Russian phase. He must be convinced that he has the definitive argument for Germany's present enterprise, for he does not, even by refutation, allude to the charges of aggression made against him. His entire effort is to obliterate from the European memory the nationalist issues which played such a large role in his original rationale of the war. The propaganda of the United Nations, therefore, should take particular pains to keep before the European peoples the nature of the ties which bind them against Hitler despite their different conceptions of social order.

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## Comments on Hitler's Speech of April 28, 1942

The principal features of Hitler's speech appear to me to be as follows:

1. This speech is one of Hitler's most carefully considered utterances in its emphasis no less than in its silences. Not all parts of the speech are directed to the same audience, a fact which gives the speech a mystifying effect.

2. The entire first part becomes intelligible only if it is taken as an attempt to awaken doubts in the minds of the British on the wisdom of continuing the war. The whole academic analysis of the British Empire and balance of power politics converges on the argument that whoever wins this war the British people will lose it. They will lose it even if only to Russia and the United States.

The section on anti-Semitism is designed to have the same effect. However absurd it may appear to us, Hitler is still firmly convinced of the usefulness of anti-Semitic propaganda as a weapon of disintegration in Great Britain and the United States. The reply that Hitler employs the term "Jewish" in a sense so vague that it becomes meaningless is of no evidence against this interpretation of his speech. He has frequently done that before, especially in his more formal speeches.

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3. Any attempt to get at the meaning and purpose of the crucial sections of the speech should not neglect to consider the fact that Hitler thinks of himself as no mean tactician. His armies having withstood the winter, everyone expected a fire-eating speech which would announce the spring offensive. Instead he dwells at great length and in great detail on the extreme difficulties of the Russian winter, openly discusses the partial breakdown of the German transport and supply systems, and speaks of a catastrophe narrowly escaped. He goes farther than this; he speaks of nerves snapping, of obedience denied, and of lack of a sense of duty in mastering these difficulties. In this connection he refers to his brutal decisions made on the basis of the "sovereign rights" delegated to him by the German people. Whether he is speaking of individual cases or of mass desertions, he does not specify. In any case he refers to them as isolated instances.

Whatever his purpose on the home front, Hitler knows and must know that such remarks as these will be interpreted abroad as evidence of a weakening morale. It is unreasonable to suppose that this effect was deliberately aimed at. Moscow, in Britain and the United States

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it did have this effect. Mr. Warburg's argument that this was not a point because in the English version transmitted later to England over the radio this section was omitted, is irrelevant, because both Goebbels and Hitler must know that on an occasion such as this every word is listened to. I should also dismiss as unworthy of serious consideration any difference between Goebbels' and Hitler's propaganda line.

4. So far as the home front is concerned these remarks coupled with the extraordinary law have a purpose that is also fairly clear. There was a failure in Russia that was due not only to the severity of the winter and Hitler admits it. If I understand this speech correctly, he means to say that the main factor in the German failure was the severity of the Russian winter, but he wants also to express these isolated instances of nerves snapping, of disobedience (whether mass or individual), of administrative weaknesses which required "brutal decisions".

Why did he ask for this added power when he already possesses it, as he says, by virtue of his "sovereign rights"? The only answer I can find is: he wanted to reveal to the widest possible German audience the feeling that dereliction of duty, inefficiency, half-hearted

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support of the war against Russia will no longer be tolerated. He can do this only by spreading terror, because that is the only way in which the Nazi state can act. Undetermined so far as the speech is concerned, must remain the question whether he is speaking only of isolated instances or of a mass phenomenon.

It is fairly clear that Hitler already had the power to dismiss any civil servant, judge, or party official. I am not so certain that he could dismiss an army officer without a court martial. Yet there is no good reason to believe that the decree is directed first at army officers, for there is no convincing evidence of a rift between Party and Army. But there were admittedly administrative bottlenecks, especially in the Reichsbahn administration which he singles out for special mention. That is why he appointed Jakob Werlin some weeks ago.

We should not forget that the bureaucracy, though mobilized, is not entirely Nazi. Even an absolute ruler or a dictatorial Party has difficulties in overcoming bureaucratic delays and routine. Hitler's only possible remedy in such a situation is terror. But this law also applies to officers not who dislike their contracts, to judges who

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have a lingering sense of justice, to workers engaged in compulsory labor which until now was limited in time.

In a word, the speech and the law are not evidence of a cracking German morale. They are a precautionary warning to all Germans in the face of the arduous spring and summer that lie ahead. The speech aims at stiffening morale at home. It would make no sense to say that it must have a demoralizing effect on Germans. Hitler knows Germans perhaps better than we do and if his party mechanism for feeling public opinion tells him that a dose of terror will strengthen German morale, he will not hesitate.

The speech therefore, if it is intelligible at all, aims at exactly opposite effects at home and abroad.

W. L. Dorn

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 14, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Administration Building

Dear Colonel:

On various occasions you have suggested that it would be a good idea if someone around the office would take time off to "think like Hitler". The memorandum which is here appended represents an attempt on the part of the Economics Division in that direction.

If you are interested in it, I would like to discuss it further with you.

Sincerely,

Edward A. [illegible]

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# HITLER'S PROBLEM IN 1942

Acceleration of the U.S. war program will progressively shift the balance of military strength against the Axis. For the present, however, the limited forces of the Allies have been attenuated by Japanese action in the Pacific. It is, therefore, Hitler's problem to utilize the period of continued Axis superiority to assure the lasting success of his venture.

Hitler must choose between two possible courses of action:

(a) To end the war by decisive military victory.

(b) To attain such a degree of economic and military security that he will be rendered impregnable to attack; and on that basis attempt to negotiate peace.

No course of military action leads unerringly to negotiated peace. Hitler has already misjudged his enemy's staying-power on several occasions. The British did not capitulate, as expected, after Dunkirk nor during the subsequent Battle of Britain. The Russians have not yielded to German power, despite serious losses. And the Allies will not surrender after Singapore. Barring decisive military defeat to all his major enemies, Hitler may attempt, but can not count upon a negotiated peace.

There is, at most, but one opportunity to end the war by decisive victory: a successful invasion of [illegible]. This, however, is certain to be a costly enterprise. In all possible theatres, Great Britain is the one most

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accessible to prompt and effective American aid. An invasion could not, further, be attempted with major Russian armies at bay in the east. And, if successful, it does not guarantee that the United States, the Dominions, and China, would cease to fight. On the basis of present information, therefore, a German attempt to invade England must be regarded as the least likely course of action that Hitler will undertake.

II. The Basic Strategy

A weighing of the alternatives, as well as the present disposition of German forces and the direction of her diplomatic action, suggest that Hitler will attempt the second line of action, - that designed to render his empire impregnable.

German tactics early in the war appear to have been based on the assumption that a series of short, sharp military campaigns would achieve, in time, total victory. This sporadic warfare would not be particularly costly. Resources would be reconstituted by each successive conquest, strength regained in the periods between campaigns. The initiative would always rest with Germany. And her enemies, piecemeal, would be destroyed or capitulate.

These tactics have not succeeded, and offer no prospect of success, against Hitler's major enemies: Russia, England and the United States. Their collective defeat - or even the retention against them of gains already won - now looms as a long continuous struggle.

Thus Hitler must attempt to guarantee the long-run economic security of his empire; and he must deny the Allies bridgeheads for their growing armed forces.

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III. Alternative Campaigns

Hitler's requirements for obtaining economic and military security involve one or more of the following:

a. Conquest and consolidation of the entire Ukraine and the Caucasus (or at least the North Caucasus).

b. Neutralization of Russia as a military threat, by force of arms or by agreement.

c. Establishment of full control of North Africa and the Mediterranean from Casablanca and the Canary Islands to Suez and the Levant.

d. Acquisition of the Middle Eastern oil-producing areas.

e. Renewal of intensive attacks on the Allies at their most vulnerable point - shipping.

Of these alternatives, the first, third, and fifth seem to rank highest in urgency. The second, for reasons discussed below, is likely to be attempted, if at all, only after success of the first is assured. The fourth is contingent upon the successful achievement of at least one and, because otherwise dangerous, probably all three of the preceding objectives. The fifth move - an accelerating attack on Allied shipping - is independent of the others and may be expected regardless of other decisions.

IV. The Alternatives Examined

THE UKRAINE AND THE CAUCASUS

The Ukraine and the Caucasus [illegible] valuable economic prize. The latter [illegible] agriculture and industrial raw mate[illegible]

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ease the tight German situation with respect to petroleum, food, and clothing materials. Although considerable time would be required fully to exploit these resources Hitler, with the Ukraine and the North Caucasus firmly in his grasp, would have taken a long step towards the goal of a self-sufficient Germany.

The attainment of this objective would require a major offensive on the southern Russian front beginning, presumably, early in April, accompanied by holding operations on the Central and Northern fronts. Unless the Russians committed the tactical error of risking their whole armed forces to oppose the German push, a campaign in the North Caucasus would not rid Hitler of his eastern opponent. He could, however, by pushing as far as Astrakhan cut off the principal oil supplies to the remaining Russian armies and markedly weaken their effectiveness.

The conclusion of such a campaign would still confront Hitler with the necessity of defending a frontier in the east considerably more than 2000 miles long. [illegible] forces would have to be held in Russia [illegible] would depend mainly on the [illegible] to oppose him. No doubt such a [illegible] considerable. To avoid the [illegible] concentrations on the Russian [illegible] will have to neutralize his [illegible]

NEUTRALIZATION OF RUSSIA AS A [illegible]

(a) By Conquest

If Germany can eliminate the [illegible] without suffering such loss as to make [illegible] next measure in 1943, she will presumably

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so. A consideration, however, of the strength of the Russian forces, the distances over which withdrawal is possible, and the magnitude of the supply problems which would confront the advancing German armies, leads us to the conclusion that Russian resistance cannot be crushed in 1942 unless tactical errors lead to the risking of too great a share of Russian manpower and materiel in stubborn and unsuccessful defense of fixed positions.

If this is the German view, the question which will confront the High Command is, How much of an advance on the Central and Northern front will it be profitable to make? The further the advance the weaker the enemy becomes in terms of materiel, productive capacity, and manpower but the longer become the German supply lines and the greater the cost in expended manpower and materiel. If Leningrad and Moscow can be taken without an exorbitant wastage of resources - and this seems to us probable - it will be done. But the German advance will fall short of decisive results. If this reasoning is correct, it follows that Germany will be confronted at the end of 1942 with its eastern enemy still in the field - though in a seriously weakened state - unless, in the meantime, peace terms can be negotiated.[1]

(b) By Peace Negotiations

It is clear that Stalin is fighting his own war, not that of the Anglo-Saxon powers. If at any stage the

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1. A factor which is difficult to evaluate is the possibility that the Japanese will be able and willing to attack in Siberia if Hitler gives the word. Clearly the final neutralization of Russia can be accomplished jointly by these Axis powers much more readily than by one alone.

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advantages to Russia of a negotiated peace outweigh those of continuing the war, Stalin will negotiate. It is difficult to see, however, that anything short of the expectation by Stalin that Germany will be able (a) to crush the Russian armies completely and (b) to hold off indefinitely the Anglo-Saxon powers in the west, would lead to a balance in favor of peace for Russia.

There can be no doubt that Germany would welcome the opportunity to free its hands of Russia for the struggle in the west and would be prepared to pay highly for it if she could be sure thereby of neutralising Russia. But the only safe way of neutralising Russia would be by disarming her and it is more than doubtful whether a peace based on Russian disarmament would be acceptable to Stalin unless he were convinced that the struggle is hopeless. Since it is our opinion, on existing evidence, that the crushing of armed resistance in Russia is beyond Germany's strength in the period before the Allies are ready to engage Germany extensively in the west, it follows that we regard the neutralisation of Russia by peace negotiations as unlikely.

It is worth emphasising, however, that Russian strength and will to resist may be heavily influenced by the margin of supplies that Britain and the United States succeed in transporting to the Russian front.

GERMAN CONTROL OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

The events of the past year in North Africa may well be interpreted by Hitler to indicate the feasibility of a push to the Suez Canal and the elimination of the British fleet from the Mediterranean with forces no larger than can be spared from the Russian campaign.

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The shipping shortage has apparently made it thus far impossible for the Allies to assemble in Egypt a force sufficient to drive the relatively small Axis concentration from Libya. In the meantime, the Far Eastern conflict is diverting shipping and war supplies which might otherwise have gone to Egypt. The circumstances therefore appear propitious for an Axis drive on the Suez Canal, accompanied by heavy air attack on British fleet units in the Mediterranean. Such an operation would require an extensive air and troop concentration and would tax severely Axis shipping facilities; but it does not seem out of the question even in conjunction with heavy engagements in Russia.

The advantages to the Axis of control of the Mediterranean and of the African approaches to Europe are very considerable. Egyptian cotton would remedy the serious Axis textile shortage. Cobalt, olive oil, and phosphate fertilizer, now flowing irregularly from French North Africa, would move unimpeded. Turkey, cut off, like Sweden, from intercourse with other powers, would undoubtedly export chrome, wool, tobacco, and foodstuffs overland to Germany. Hitler would thereby have brought Turkey into the German economic orbit without having risked the uncertainties of a difficult campaign.

It appears unlikely that the Axis, in control of the North African littoral, from Suez to Tunis, would experience serious political or military difficulties in occupying Northwest Africa. With the whole North African coast in its hands the most feasible bridge to Europe would be denied to the Allies, and impo[illegible]

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new bases for attack on Allied shipping could be brought to bear.

On the whole, the advantages to the Axis of control of the Mediterranean would seem to justify a large-scale expenditure of resources. And since offensive operations against Russia can not begin until April, a Mediterranean campaign, immediately undertaken, need conflict but little with the later offensive.

THE MIDDLE EAST

The Middle East - Iran and Iraq - plays a complex role in the German strategic position. It is, first, a major source of oil. But if the Caucasus is successfully occupied by Germany, the oil fields of the Middle East will not then be an economic objective of immediate importance. Second, the Middle East represents a potential base for attack on Europe. If Hitler acquires the Caucasus and the Mediterranean, however, its importance in this respect will be virtually neutralised. But the oil fields of the Middle East serve also as a major source of supply to Allied naval and merchant vessels operating in the Indian Ocean. The loss of this source, if combined with the loss of Far Eastern oil supplies, would weaken the blockade in the area, facilitate trade with the Far East, where Japan now holds rubber and tin supplies badly needed by Germany, and isolate China and India after the manner of Turkey. It is, then, as part of a pincer movement on Allied oil supplies in the East that Germany is most likely to undertake a campaign against Iran and Iraq.

The German arm of this pincer is not likely to be attempted, however, until the Mediterranean and Caucasus operations are completed and new bases consolidated.

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involves, at least, extended and tenuous lines of communication as well as long and vulnerable flanks. It is not a campaign essential to the German plan as outlined earlier. It hinges on the success of previous German and Japanese operations.

CONCLUSION

It is judged to be Hitler's aim in 1942 to master an area as impregnable as possible to Allied attack, and capable of maintaining a continuously high war potential. This end can be virtually achieved by (a) the conquest of the Ukraine and the North Caucasus; (b) a further considerable advance on the North and Central fronts in Russia, which would, at the same time, seriously weaken Russian strength and willingness to resist; and (c) the conquest and occupation of the areas bordering on the Mediterranean.

The results of such an achievement by the Axis would be so disastrous to Allied interests as largely to nullify the advantage in armed strength expected in 1943. Aggressive measures are imperative at the earliest possible moment.

Our alternatives, like Hitler's, are two:

(1) To strive for decisive victory in 1942.

(2) To prevent Hitler from achieving his goal of impregnability this year.

We cannot wait for our increased war production to become effective in 1943 and thereafter.

The first alternative could be accomplished only by successful invasion of the European continent. [illegible] is regarded as impossible by [illegible] submitted. It is therefore [illegible] strategy be focussed on [illegible]

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The general priority of Allied counter-action would appear to be:

1. Quickly effective aid to Russia. The quantities of immediately useful military supplies sent to this area should be limited only by the capacity of Russian ports to discharge and to dispatch cargo. The existence of an eastern front in 1943 is essential to Allied success.
2. The maintenance or acquisition of bridgeheads to Europe on the North African coast. If Egypt can be held, the conditions for an Allied offensive in Europe are immeasurably improved.
3. Aid to China and to the Dutch, in an effort to prevent the denial of Far Eastern oil to the Allies and the opening of commercial shipping lanes between Japan and German controlled areas.

Only the immediate contemplation of a large-scale offensive in the west would justify the continued shipment of men and material to Britain at the present time in competition with the program indicated above.

The importance of shipping to above objectives is obvious. Equally clear is the need to give ship-building the highest priority in our production program.

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

MEMORANDUM April 27, 1942

TO Colonel William J. Donovan

FROM J. P. Warburg

SUBJECT Hitler's Speech

The outstanding points about the Hitler speech seem to me these:

1. There seems to have been no good reason for making the speech except the necessity for dealing with the German internal situation.

(a) The whole first part seems to attempt to say to the German people: "I did not start this war. The British and the Jews did." The length of this section would indicate that there must be people in Germany who feel that this is Hitler's war and who are dissatisfied with it.

(b) The section which deals with the winter campaign is defensive in nature. It seems in a way to apologize for certain severe measures which had to be taken, which clearly indicates that there was, if not mutiny, at least widespread dissatisfaction among the troops. We have had such stories of dissatisfaction from various sources.

(c) The promises that the railroads will work better, the supply organizations be more effective, etc. imply that they broke down during the winter.

(d) The violent denunciation of RAF bombings and the threat of reprisals seems to have been purely for German consumption, since this whole section was omitted from the English version transmitted to England. This section was therefore not intended to frighten the British but to reassure the Germans. The implication is that the Germans are badly rattled by the RAF bombings.

2. It is notable that the speech contains no promise of victory in 1942, or, for that matter, any other time. It stresses the necessity for avoiding defeat, but lacks any of the assurance of previous speeches.

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3. The speech contains the flat statement that the outcome of this war will be settled on the Eastern Front. This falls right into the line we have been taking of telling the Germans that unless Hitler succeeds in knocking the Russians out of the war this summer his defeat is certain.

4. It is notable that Hitler stressed the submarine as the weapon by which he would reduce England. There is no hint of invasion, and aerial warfare is only mentioned as a reprisal measure.

5. The speech shows a good deal of preoccupation with the commando raids.

6. The whole climax of the speech - his request for absolute power over every German - speaks for itself. Obviously Hitler has this power already. The fact that he made this strange demand to the Reichstag is a clear indication of some sort of trouble at home. The suspicion that this was a plant in order to create false hopes among the United Nations is probably not justified, because references to the home front and to the decree were omitted from most of the short wave summaries sent out to foreign countries.

7. Finally, it is interesting to note the increasing number of references to the Almighty and to Providence, which may perhaps indicate that Hitler has lost some of his confidence in himself and in German arms.

Conclusion: I believe the speech warrants the inference that Germany has suffered more heavily during the winter than we have been inclined to assume, that the Germans are themselves quite worried, and that they are probably going into this spring and summer with a far less definite plan and with less confidence than we have been inclined to assume.

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The following is a description of the General Headquarters of Hitler as related by an aide of Horthy of Hungary on a recent visit to Hitler:

From his special train, Hitler directs all operations personally, devoting to them his undivided attention and taking the most scrupulous care over details. From this train he has 'conducted' the campaigns in Poland, Belgium, the Low Countries, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Greece and Yugoslavia. Still in the same train, the Chancellor is today issuing his orders to the entire Russian front, which extends for thousands of kilometres.

Adolph Hitler has spent nearly two years in his G.H.Q. which with its military offices and modern installations constitutes the

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most highly protected secrets - if I may so term it - in the world. Here like all roads converge, all is assembled there; it is there that decisions are reached and all plans concerning the war are drawn up; to that point all reports, whether of major or minor importance, are directed; troop advances or retreats, however small the units, movements and action of submarines and aircraft and details of the gigantic, almost inconceivable, organisation for supplying the armies - a titanic task, organised with clockwork precision.

It will not surprise anybody to hear that this G.H.Q. is carefully concealed in the woods, in the [illegible] where it cannot be detected by enemy 'planes. It is known, however, that at whatever sector of the front it happens to be, a larger number of anti-aircraft guns are placed



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together with an extra heavy reinforcement of military police.

In the middle of the encampment is the Fuehrer's coach, and around him are the various offices, which can be dismantled in a few minutes: cars, autocars and caterpillar-cars complete the circle.

The geographical and topographical maps on which the development of operations in the East are noted hour by hour are situated in a separate tent called "the eastern tent". In the tent set aside for the 'west' are the geographical plans relating to operations against England.

Among the various cars at the Headquarters is that of Herr Dietrich, head of the Reich press; beside the radio coaches are placed those for wireless telegraphy. There a stupendous task is carried out. There can hardly be a



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whatever happens in the world which might is not picked up by these installations, fixed are equipped with all the latest instruments. The men in charge of these posts work day and night.

The Fuehrer is therefore kept informed of all that is happening in the Reich and all over the world, hour by hour, minute by minute, and if he does not go mad it is because he is a genius, a phenomenon of nature - which indeed is tantamount to being mad.

Hitler generally spends the greater part of his day in the so-called "eastern tent." With his marshals he studies developments in the military situation with minute attention. It is doubtless in this tent that the ideas and plans which surprise the enemy are conceived. I would even venture to say that it is there that modern strategy is evolved. And those in the



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Fuehrer's immediate circle do not conceal [illegible] that everything which has determined the German victories has been his work. His is the spirit which guides this formidable war machine, the greatest of all time. From this G.H.Q. he also directs the Reich's internal affairs. The Ministers, the Party Chiefs, Goebbels and von Ribbentrop, visit the Chancellor 'somewhere on the eastern front.'"

He nearly always travels by plane. He has at his disposal an enormous 'FOCKE WULF' and a tiny 'JUNKERS 52' of the type used by the air force. He uses one or other of these machines as a rule when visiting the various sectors of the front. The sheds of the G.H.Q. also contain a third machine which is capable of landing on any sort of ground. Furthermore he has at his disposal a very high-powered grey car in which



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he visits the [illegible] forces [illegible]
runabout called an "[illegible]."

He eats the same food as his soldiers and sometimes takes his meals in the military canteen.

People who have had the opportunity of seeing him at close quarters say that during these two years of war his appearance has not changed. The lines on his rather pale face have perhaps deepened a little but he still keeps his good humor and perfect health. His hair is beginning to go grey at the temples, but his step has not lost its elasticity, and he holds himself very erect.

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

FROM: Hugh R. Wilson

DATE: May 13, 1943

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT:

I return herewith the photostat of Hitler's speech of April 26, 1942.

If I enlarge on certain points it is not that I find myself in sharp disagreement with the analysis, rather the contrary. It is to underscore certain phases of the speech and the reception accorded it in this country.

The winter campaign in Russia never gave me the impression of a German debacle, the retirement of the Germans seems to have been orderly, and the occupation or loss of some hundreds of miles in that vast area cannot have been of momentous strategic importance. The importance of the battle lay in the impression upon the world. For the first time the blitzkrieg had failed to annihilate, for the first time the Germans were on the defensive, and it had been demonstrated that the Germans were not invincible.

It seems to me that this was what Hitler had in mind, the impression that the winter's struggle had made upon his people, and other peoples of the world. He was trying to point out the tremendous difficulties of the task and to carry conviction to them asserting that now they had been mastered.

You know my conviction, one sustained by interviews and reports, that the German people feel that they are battling for desolation or conquest. Nothing has come to them any alternative to battle to the end. In this connection, I am attaching as a supplement a copy of a memorandum previously sent you. As I said, the German people had no need for encouragement, but need to be dazzled by false promises of the breaking of the dawn.

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With the writer's belief that legality was sought after the purge and not before, I am also in accord. As soon as I read his words, I wondered who had been liquidated. It may be years before we know, but I am convinced that he sought justification after the fact, as he did in 1934. The day of his speech I listened to Kaltenborn on the radio. The commentator was certain that the speech was to gain authorization to liquidate Göring. I thought then how little the speaker had absorbed of Hitler's method. Where Hitler has to intimidate a people, he will use threats in advance. Where he is dealing with internal problems, he will strike ruthlessly and silently, and talk about it later.

That curious mingling of hatred and affection for England is brought out sharply in the memorandum. It is one of the most striking points in the German character. I have never met a German in high position who did not dream of the realization of a German-English alliance. The trouble always was that they always felt that the alliance could not be between equals until Germany had proved its superiority on the continent. I know this type of thought was strong in Ribbentrop, I know it for Göring as well. With Hitler I feel it through reports of conversations rather than through personal knowledge. Certainly through the Sudetenland crisis, I sensed a curious elation among the leading Nazis who burst out from time to time with the exclamation "Now the time is ripe for our rapprochement to England."

This German attribute explains in a large measure the type of "peace offer" Hitler has repeatedly made. German predominance on the continent, British predominance through its world empire on the seas, but only an understanding based on English recognition of Germany's power and place. The Herald Tribune on May 5 published an editorial on peace offers. It pointed out that Napoleon and the late Kaiser both met disaster by waiting too long for a genuine offer, that Hitler might have the genius to see when the tide was just beginning to turn and avoid the fate that met the other two. Personally, I doubt whether Hitler will do so. His character is so violent, he

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will talk in terms of a conqueror until he dies. He could not bring himself to use the phraseology either in a proposal or in negotiation that would make peace a possibility. Some other German in his position might do so.

HRW

Hugh R. Wilson

Attachment.

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CONFIDENTIAL March 17, 1943

propaganda, in the sense of the forceful presentation of new ideas, seem to be effective only in periods of defeat and discouragement. I do not know of a case in the past where a people have revolted against their government when the forces of that government are on a victorious march.

The Japanese, therefore, would not seem to be in a mood at present when propaganda could be effective. Furthermore, the characteristics of that people are so immutable that it is difficult to believe that alien thought and argument can ever make their appeal.

In Germany, on the other hand, the ground would seem to be much more fertile. First, the German people are highly mystic, they readily accept ideas. They have no brakes in humor or common sense on the reaches of their fancy, so that their resulting philosophy frequently develops into grotesque of exaggeration. Thus they fluctuate more widely in the field of their philosophy than any race I know of. Second, they have suffered a severe military check in Russia. Their losses have been great and they have given considerable ground. Further, Hitler has assumed supreme command at just this moment and thus has made himself responsible for military results, and responsible before a warrior race who held their General Staff almost in reverence for hundreds of years. With such a race, it must be staggering to have a lance-corporal move in on their supreme technical command.

It would appear, therefore, that it is essential at the moment to direct our greatest effort in propaganda on Germany, and only secondarily in anticipation on Japan.

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For such purpose, we must have a thesis, and one which has a chance of being tempting to the German people. We can beat Germany -- of this I am convinced -- but we can accomplish this in a much shorter time if we have the help of some of the German people. Twenty-five years ago, President Wilson developed a philosophy which was worth several army corps to us in breaking down German morale. In other words, in giving the German people an alternative to dying, to the last man, for the Kaiser. Up to this moment in the present struggle, we have done nothing nor suggested anything, I feel, which has alienated one German in Germany from Hitler, nor have we offered any alternative to the Germans which was better than a struggle to the death to preserve his nation. Knowing something of the Germans, I feel sure that "access to raw materials," fair field in international trade, even democracy and individual rights, bulk far less largely in their imagination than the future of the race--Germany's place in the family of nations; Germany's pride and prestige; Germany's desire to be not only one of the great powers but to be consulted and treated as such.

To my mind, nothing offers such brilliant hope for the future as the Anglo-American cooperation which the President initiated with Mr. Churchill. It is exactly the type of thing to carry into the future. It is without rigid form, hence pragmatic and able to follow the method of trial and error, so dear to the Anglo-Saxon. While the newspaper editors have labelled the collaboration as an "alliance," both Chiefs of State have scrupulously refrained from use of the word, and with profound wisdom. An "alliance" no matter how powerful invariably sooner or later calls into being somewhere in the world a hostile and counter-balancing force. A "collaboration" is under no such inexorable condition.

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"Collaboration", intimate as it may be between two [illegible] thing and has no need to be exclusive. It can and doubtless will [illegible] conference or even to collaboration, states which have a like [illegible]. The only yardstick for admitting the collaboration of a state [illegible] its determination to maintain peace and order. Form of govern- will not matter -- certainly we will have to collaborate with a [illegible] Soviet Union through reconstruction days and thereafter. Our criterion, it seems to me, will have to be "does this state want to [illegible] the peace?" If it does, we must work with it and admit it councils, no matter what its form of government. To do otherwise [illegible] to ensure a repetition of a world struggle.

[illegible] our philosophy there would seem to me every reason to [illegible] say so formally and emphatically. Some genius may find [illegible] to German thinking, but my mind cannot conceive of any- effective. Such a declaration would mean to the Germans that [illegible] thrown out Hitler and his gang and had convinced the Russians [illegible] themselves of peaceful intent, they could begin to collabor- [illegible] the great Powers for the maintenance of peace, for great projects [illegible] areas, etc. Their "place in the sun" would [illegible], and they would not necessarily be condemned to another [illegible] humiliation through their exclusion from the councils of [illegible]. Suffering and fatigue wear them down, so more and more the [illegible] propitiy for a way to end the struggle. If it can be in- [illegible] the way is in their own hands, the war may be immeasurably [illegible]. If it is felt that Germany must be punished, and it may well [illegible], then let her be punished. The punishment may be formidable, [illegible] not be enduring. The Germans themselves may, in their fluc-

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tuating philosophy, recognize the necessity of punishment, but they will recognize it the more readily if they see light beyond, if they can be convinced that when they have purged themselves, their place as a great people is awaiting them.

It would be fascinating to explore this thought further, as to its influence in a post-war world, but this organization is dealing with the present only. Hence I am treating the subject from the propaganda phase only. I cannot refrain from adding, however, that I have been convinced for years that there is no enduring peace without German participation, that even an overwhelming victory would demand from the victors a sustained ruthlessness of which they are incapable, if they attempt to set up a post-war organization for peace without the collaboration of Germany.

Certainly such a declaration as I suggest would have to be most carefully phrased. It could not be put as an obvious appeal to Germans to revolt against their leaders. The memory of the fourteen points and their reception at Versailles are still too vivid in the German mind. It would have to be done cautiously and by inference and the repetition of the thought would not only make it penetrate, but also might well, after a period of time, cause a belief in its sincerity.

I doubt whether we could count upon much help from the English in this connection. I have only met Mr. Churchill, but have read him deeply. I could imagine him showing great generosity to a conquered foe; however, I could not imagine his bellicose nature paying great attention to subtle means of wearing him down. Mr. Eden, on the other hand, I know intimately. I am sure that his is not the type of mind to

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[redacted] with matters of long range effect. His mind leaps and clings to the problems of today. President Roosevelt, however, might be deeply interested in such a thought, both from the point of view of today and for the future. If he were interested, he could carry the program consummately well.

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[illegible]

This article seems to foreshadow a concentration of power in the hands of the dictator – blatantly and without any pretense of legal formulation. It is no surprise that the announcement of this emergency law is connected with the threat against the judges whose very existence in such a state of emergency provides a link with the despised constitutional state. It does not mean, however, that the Fuehrer has been incurring opposition from the existing judicature. In civil, as in criminal, jurisdiction those judges who showed any independence have been replaced a long time ago.

(b) In Hitler's speech, the abolition of the duly acquired rights is tied up with the leave of office workers. This is a real threat not to an individual but to a whole class of people who, up to now, belonged to the staunchest supporters of Hitler – the white-collared workers. Hitler ranks the working man and woman next to the soldier at the front, but the office workers, according to him, will have to give up some of their comforts in order to be considered equal to these two groups. Hitler expected some

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[redacted]

(c) [redacted]

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

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